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THE SYSTEMIC RISK PARADOX:
BANKS AND CLEARINGHOUSES
UNDER REGULATION
Felix B. Chang*
Consolidation in the financial industry threatens
competition and increasessystemic risk. Recently, banks have
seen both high-profile mergers and spectacular failures,
prompting a flurry of regulatory responses. Yet consolidation
has not been as closely scrutinized for clearinghouses,which
facilitate trading in securities and derivatives products.
These nonbank intermediaries can be thought of as
middlemen who collect deposits to ensure that each buyer and
seller has the wherewithal to uphold its end of the deal.
Clearinghouses mitigate the credit risks that buyers and
sellers would face if they dealt directly with each other.
Yet here lies the dilemma: large clearinghouses reduce
credit risk, but they heighten systemic risk since the collapse
of one such entity threatens the entire financial system. While
regulators have tackled the systemic risks posed by large
banks, the systemic risks of these nonbank intermediaries
have received less attention. In fact, financial reform has
spurred clearinghousegrowth and consolidation.
This Article examines the paradoxical treatment of
regulators toward the systemic risks of clearinghouses and
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banks. It explores two fundamental questions: Why does the
paradox exist, and who benefits from it? This Article borrows
from antitrust to offer a framework for ensuring that the
entities that control a large clearinghouse (large, heavily
regulated banks) do not abuse that clearinghouse's market
dominance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Systemic risk-the risk posed to the entire financial
system by the collapse of one major player'-has become a
household term. The demise of a systemically significant
investment bank, Lehman Brothers, marked the onset of the
2008 financial crisis.2 Afterward, a $700 billion aid package
to the financial sector highlighted the moral hazard of using
public funds to bail out banks deemed too big to fail.3 Wellattuned to both systemic risk and its corollary, moral hazard,
financial regulators now possess additional tools to curb risk
and wind down systemically significant banks on the verge of
failure.4
Less well known are the systemic risks posed by
clearinghouses and market-makers in the securities and
industries. Like banks, these nonbank
derivatives
intermediaries facilitate financial transactions among
counterparties. Stock exchanges, for example, provide

1 More precisely, systemic risk has been defined as "the risk that (i)

an economic shock .. .triggers . . .either (X) the failure of a chain of
markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial
institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in
its availability .. " Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193,
204 (2008).
2 See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-FrankAct, 5 FDIC Q., no. 2, 2011,
at 31, 33 [hereinafter FDIC, Lehman Brothers].
3 Matt Erickson et al., Tracking the 700 Billion Dollar Bailout, N.Y.
TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/creditcrisis/recipients/table (last visited
Jan. 28, 2014).
4 For example, the Volcker Rule and Orderly Liquidation Authority
(OLA) under Dodd-Frank represent two solutions currently en vogue. See
Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54
B.C. L. Rev. 469 (2013); Stephen J. Lubben, Resolution, Orderly and
Otherwise: B of A in OLA, 81 U. CIN. L. REv. 485 (2012). However, debate
rages on over whether Dodd-Frank will eradicate "too big to fail" ("TBTF').
See Does the Dodd-Frank Act End "Too Big to Fail?": Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Cong. 67, 83 (2011) (statements of Michael H. Krimminger,
Gen. Counsel, FDIC, and Stephen J. Lubben, Professor of Law, Seton Hall
Univ. Sch. of Law).
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platforms for prospective buyers and sellers of securities to
view price quotations. Should a set of counterparties decide
to buy and sell the same stock, then another intermediary,
the clearinghouse, will facilitate payment by the buyer and
delivery of stock by the seller.5 As with banks, failure and
consolidation have propelled exchanges and clearinghouses
toward systemically significant size. In the last ten years,
the storied New York Stock Exchange has undergone several
incarnations by way of merger or acquisition.' In the clearing
space, the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC)
dominates almost the entire securities market.7
Despite these similarities, the regulatory regime for large
banks has generally not been deployed for large
clearinghouses. 8 Part of this can be attributed to the view
that clearing is an essential part of trading. As it navigated
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission
5 The three different back-office functions in support of trading are
generally conflated as "clearing." These functions are (i) matching of
orders, (ii) clearing, and (iii) settlement (effecting delivery or payment).
For excellent summaries, see DERMOT TURING, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT
IN EUROPE §§ 1.2-1.14 (2012); John McPartland, Clearing and Settlement
Demystified, CHICAGO FED LET. (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago,
IL), no. 210, 2005, at 1.
6 NYSE Euronext, the operator of the New York Stock Exchange,
would have been sold in 2012 to the German exchange operator Deutsche
Borse had European antitrust regulators not blocked the deal. NYSE
Euronext is itself the product of a merger of the NYSE Group and
Euronext. NYSE, Timeline, http://perma.cc/F4QL-4P3P (last visited Nov.
19, 2014). Now, NYSE Euronext will likely be acquired by the
IntercontinentalExchange (ICE), best known for market making in the
derivatives space. See Nathaniel Popper, The Big Board, in One Big Gulp,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013, at BUL.
7 The volume of trades handled by NSCC is mindboggling: in 2012,
the average daily value of equities activity was $742.7 billion. See DTCC,
National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), http://perma.cc/7ZK3BNXA (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). Yet, even this figure is far short of the
size of the over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives markets, roughly $700
trillion (notional value). Bank for Int'l Settlements, Derivatives Statistics,
tbl. 19 (Sept. 14, 2014), http://perma.cc/877H-SL8C?type=pdf.
8
But see infra Section III.C.1, which discusses the designation of
eight clearinghouses as systemically important and therefore eligible for
liquidity assistance.
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in 1976, the NSCC was described as a "public utility,"9 a
moniker that gave the entity a free pass to expand and
monopolize.
Additionally, the very nature of clearinghouses ensures
that they will be too big to fail ("TBTF") and, hence, that a
resolution mechanism predicated upon eradicating TBTF is
inapposite. A clearinghouse interposes itself between buyers
and sellers of financial instruments to mitigate counterparty
and credit risks. As the party in the middle, the
clearinghouse extracts deposits from both seller and buyer so
that the clearinghouse can fulfill the transaction should
either party default.1" Like all guarantors, the larger a
clearinghouse is, the more liabilities it can ensure. Size
begets liquidity, which in turn begets stability. Under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act ("Dodd-Frank"), the clearinghouse has been given even
greater prominence, charged with curtailing risk in the
massive over-the-counter derivatives market.1
A paradox thus haunts our approach to systemic risk:
while regulators try to eradicate systemic risk in banks, they
must tolerate systemic risk in clearinghouses. Every major
trading market today is dominated by a very small number
of clearinghouses. The options market, for example, is served
entirely by the Options Clearing Corporation. The credit
default swaps market clears most of its trades through
LCH.Clearnet. The fall of any such clearinghouse could bring
down an entire industry. If banking and securities laws
allow regulated entities to attain systemically significant
sizes, then, in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers and the
$700 billion bailout, it is worth asking whether those laws

9 See Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1101 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
10 These deposits are called "margin." Margin consists of initial
margin-what counterparties must come to the table with to trade-and
variation margin-what counterparties must post from time to time, given
fluctuations in their positions.
11 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C.
§ 8302(d)(1) (2012). For perspectives on the size of the OTC derivatives
market, see supra note 7 and text accompanying infra notes 78-80.
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have adequately balanced the service performed by these
institutions with their propensity to barrel toward bigness.
Where financial regulations
fail to so balance, we must look
2
solutions.'
for
elsewhere
This Article recasts the story of clearinghouses as part of
a larger narrative about regulatory (mis)management of
systemic risk. It joins an emerging body of academic
literature on clearinghouses that has grown steadily in the
last half decade but nevertheless glossed over comparisons to
banks. On the subject of clearinghouses, legal scholarship
has lagged behind financial and economic scholarship. While
financial modeling has coalesced around the theory that
large clearinghouses confer greater benefits onto trading
markets,' 3 the legal academy has been slow to respond with

12 Most of the proposed solutions to TBTF clearinghouses have orbited
around familiar corporate and banking principles. See Kristin N. Johnson,
ClearinghouseGovernance: Moving Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 681, 682-84, 707-08 (2012) (corporate governance); Sean J. Griffith,
Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Derivatives
Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1156-57, 1240 (2012) (corporate
governance); Kristin N. Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving
Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 682-84, 707-08 (2012)
(corporate governance); Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps,
Clearinghouses,and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized CounterpartiesMust
Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 51, 77-78
(2011) (access to the Federal Reserve's emergency liquidity); Julia Lees
Allen, Note, Derivatives Clearinghousesand Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy
and Dodd-FrankAnalysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1106-07 (2012) (capital
requirements and guaranty fund). There are, however, some outside-thebox suggestions. See Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of
Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 434 (2013)
(proposing, among other things, engagement by clearinghouses with a
broader constituency); Christine A. Varney, Assist. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't
of Justice Antitrust Div., Comments before the U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, Washington, D.C., at 4-5, 9 (Dec. 28, 2010) (arguing for
ownership limits from the perspective of promoting competition); Yesha
Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghousesin Complex Markets, 101
GEO. L.J. 387, 434 (2013) (proposing, among other things, engagement by
clearinghouses with a broader constituency).
13 For the benefits of netting efficiency from large clearinghouses that
might clear across products, see Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a
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regulatory frameworks that would incentivize consolidation
while patrolling monopolization. This Article attempts to fill
those gaps. It contributes to existing scholarship by (i)
explaining the clearinghouse/bank paradox and (ii) adapting
antitrust to sensibly harness the economies of scale of large
clearinghouses.
By delving into comparisons, this Article shows that the
aversion to bank systemic risk and tolerance of
clearinghouse systemic risk is merely paradoxical on the
surface. Banks and clearinghouses inhabit very different
markets, and their core traits are also very different.
Nonetheless, both institutions raise the specter of bailoutbanks are built upon deposits that must be backed by the
government, while clearinghouses are so integral to the
14
financial system that their failure cannot be allowed.
However, current solutions to stave off TBTF in
clearinghouses are halfhearted. Whereas a blueprint exists
for intervening on behalf of systemically important banks
during illiquidity and insolvency, the only clear plan of
assistance to a systemically important clearinghouse is for a
liquidity crisis. The impression created is one of ignorance
or, worse, confusion on the part of regulators.
In exploring the interaction between regulation and the
clearing markets, this Article sets up the possibility of
borrowing from antitrust to resolve the quandary presented
by large clearinghouses. Antitrust is adept at weighing size
against an array of other considerations. Recently, scholars
have used antitrust principles as proxies for stagnant
banking paradigms-for instance, monopoly power as a
proxy for TBTF and anti-tying rules as a proxy for checks on
aggressive sales practices.1" The next step would be to pair

Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET
PRICING STUD. 74, 74, 76 (2011).
14 See infra Section III.A.
15 See Felix B. Chang, Death to Credit as Leverage: Using the Bank
Anti-Tying Provision to Curb FinancialRisk, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 851,
898-900 (2013); Sharon E. Foster, Systemic Financial-ServiceInstitutions
and Monopoly Power, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 357, 359-60 (2011); For other
innovative approaches of using antitrust to contain TBTF and systemic
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antitrust and financial regulations to strike a more perfect
balance between stability and competition, as well as
between systemic risk and credit risk.
For now, though, financial regulators have discounted the
anticompetitive effects of large clearinghouses. The unsung
consequence of touting counterparty credit concerns above
all else is that competition suffers as well. Competition
suffers in both the clearing market and the market for
selling the cleared instruments. This is because the entities
that control a large clearinghouse (ironically, the big banks)
can leverage their dominance in the clearing market to
foreclose the dealer market. In two recent actions in Europe
and the United States, access to clearinghouses was the
lynchpin for suppression of competition in the sale of credit
default swaps.16 Clearinghouse research is therefore timely
in illuminating a windfall to heavily regulated banks.
Further, this research is timely because the next test of how
as a
antitrust laws apply to regulated industries might come
17
challenge to the natural monopoly of clearinghouses.
Part II of this Article illustrates how financial
intermediaries have evolved into systemic significance. Part
III dissects the contradictions posed by large banks and large
clearinghouses. Part IV reveals the beneficiaries of large

risk, see Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a
Model for Breaking up the Banks that Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 821, 844, 856-57 (2011) (using the Public Utility Holding Company
Act to guide the organization of bank-holding companies); Jonathan R.
Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., FailureIs an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1371 (2011)
(limiting bank liabilities to 5% of the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund).
16 See Press Release,
European Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission
Probes Credit Default Swaps Market (Apr. 29, 2011), available at
http://perma.ccV285-UZN5; Class Action Complaint, MF Global Capital
LLC v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:13-cv-05417, 2013 WL 7210066 (N.D.
Ill. July 29, 2013). See also text accompanying infra notes 155-58 and 186.
17 On the murky balance between antitrust and regulation after
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S.
398 (2004), and Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264
(2007), see Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and
Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683, 684 (2011).
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clearinghouses

and

considers

how

antitrust

might

complement clearinghouse regulation.
II. THE APPARENT PARADOX
Under Dodd-Frank, clearinghouses are a key circuit
breaker for risk in the derivatives market. This section
situates Dodd-Frank's derivatives clearing organizations
(DCOs) within a broader context of nonbank intermediaries
in the securities, options, and futures industries that have
been allowed to consolidate and pre-empt competition. To
draw a distinction, this section begins with commercial
banks, investment banks, and hedge funds, whose systemic
risks have at times provoked regulatory policy. This
dichotomy, whose poles are marked by the DCO and the
commercial bank, is the systemic risk paradox.
A. Commercial Banks, Investment Banks, and Hedge
18
Funds
The fear that banks might become TBTF-and, therefore,
require a public bailout to save the economy-is not new. 9 In
1984, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
rescued Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust
Company, then the country's seventh largest financial
institution. Continental had lent aggressively and sunk $1
billion into nearly worthless oil and gas participations; the
failure of those ventures led to an acute run on the bank.2 °
Fearing a crisis to the financial system, the FDIC swooped in
18 This Article lumps commercial banks, investment banks, and hedge
funds together. While investment banks and hedge funds are not as closely
regulated as commercial banks, regulators have acknowledged and tried to
mitigate their systemic risks.
19 The FDIC has noted that "too big to liquidate" might be more
accurate than TBTF; large banks have failed in the past, but regulators
sometimes felt that liquidation would not have contained systemic risk.
See FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING
CRISIS OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990s, Vol. I, at 249 (1997), available at
http://perma.cc/8UFH-QDMZ.
20 Id. at 236-41. Prior to Washington Mutual's failure in 2008,
Continental had been the biggest bank failure in U.S. history.

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2014

to purchase $4.5 billion in bad loans from the bank, acquire
$1 billion in preferred stock, and guarantee protection for all
of Continental's creditors.21 Subsequently, Congress passed
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991,22 which limited the FDIC's ability to protect
uninsured depositors-except in cases of "serious adverse
effects on economic conditions or financial stability. 2 3 This
exception effectively codified the TBTF doctrine.
While regulatory attention was directed toward the risks
posed by large commercial banks, the collapse of the hedge
fund Long-Term Capital Management ("LTCM") in 1998
showed that nonbank financial entities could also pose risks
to the economy.2 4 LTCM was a hedge fund that made bets on
interest rate spreads. 25 The fund's earlier success had caused
its managers and traders, in ever-greater bouts of hubris, to
pursue increasingly leveraged positions through derivatives
products.2 6 When the Russian government in August 1998
devalued the ruble, cavernous gaps opened between the
yields of U.S. Treasury securities and other debt
instruments, as well as in credit spreads across the world.
LTCM suffered catastrophic losses, compounded by its
leveraged positions. Its management attempted but failed to

21 Id. at 244. This last tactic was the most controversial. FDIC
insurance had protected deposits up to $100,000; with the Continental
bailout, however, the FDIC promised to protect even uninsured depositors
and creditors.
22 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2282 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823 (2012)).
23 See id. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012); Paul L. Lee, The Dodd-Frank Act
Orderly LiquidationAuthority: A PreliminaryAnalysis and Critique-Part
I, 128 BANKING L.J. 771, 773 (2011); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to
Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 957, 996 (1992).
24 Hedge Fund Operations: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on Banking
and Fin. Servs., 105th Cong. 141, at 16 (1998) (statement of William J.
McDonough, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.), available at
http://perma.cc/U24X-BX2C [hereinafter Hedge Fund Operations].
25 Id. at 16-17.
26 Id. at 17.
27 Id.
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negotiate a buyout by investment banks. The Federal
Reserve Bank of New York stepped in and orchestrated a
$3.75 billion bailout.
LTCM illustrates another theme about systemic risk:
while size can render a financial institution systemically
significant, so too can the breadth of its interconnectivity
with other players. LTCM was linked to numerous
counterparties in the equity and debt markets; its default
would have caused its top seventeen counterparties to close
out their positions, to $3-5 billion in losses.28 As is common
in derivatives transactions, those counterparties would have
"back-to-backed" their positions with LTCM by buying
offsetting swaps with additional counterparties, who would
have suffered losses as well.2 9 The ensuing blow to investor
confidence would have led to a massive exodus from the
equity markets, further widening credit spreads and causing
liquidation of positions.'
Hence, the Federal Reserve
stepped in.
The similarities between LTCM and the investment bank
Lehman Brothers (Lehman) are uncanny: the coincidence of
highly leveraged investments (through derivatives) and the
widening of worldwide credit spreads brought down LTCM,
just as the combination of leverage and a mortgage downturn
felled Lehman. And just as Lehman's leverage began to
endanger the investment bank in 2008-almost 10 years to
the day of LTCM's woes-the investment bank too failed to
negotiate a rescue by Warren Buffet (also a potential suitor
to LTCM in 1998) and a consortium of other banks. The

28 PRESIDENT'S

WORKING

GRP.

ON

FIN.

MKTs.,

HEDGE

LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

FUNDS,

17-22

(1999).
29 See Hedge Fund Operations, supra note 24, at 19. ("[I]n the rush of
Long-Term Capital's counterparties to close out their positions, other
market participants, investors who had no dealings with Long-Term
Capital, would have been affected as well."). Regulators might have
allowed LTCM's counterparties to suffer the losses as penance for
transacting with the wrong entity, but losses to the counterparties of those
counterparties would have been less justifiable.
30

Id.
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primary difference, though, was that Lehman failed to close
the deal on a rescue, with catastrophic effects. Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s bankruptcy filing allowed for
unwinding, at heavy penalties, of its subsidiaries' derivative
positions. 1 Consequently, $468 million in assets which one
subsidiary had pledged as collateral was seized; those assets
were comprised of customer accounts from other
relationships, but the customers had little recourse. 2 As
contagion spread to other Lehman customers and
counterparties, the global economic and financial crisis of
2008 was born.
Today, the solutions that regulators devised to stave off
future failures of Lehman's magnitude reside in DoddFrank's Title I and Title II. Title I establishes the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, which has the power to
designate systemically important financial institutions
(SIFIs) for comprehensive federal regulation and heightened
prudential standards. 3 The definition of a SIFI is broad
enough to bring the three institutions considered in this
Section-commercial banks, investment banks, and hedge
funds-into the regulatory fold. SIFIs encompass (i) bank
holding companies with total consolidated assets of at least
$50 billion 4 and (ii) nonbanks whose "material financial
distress" or "nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of... activities.., could pose a
threat to the stability of the United States. 35

31

See FDIC, Lehman Brothers, supra note 2, at 33.

32

Id. at 34.

33 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392-93 (2010) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 5321 (2012)).
34 Id. § 5365(a).
35 Id.
§ 5323(a). The SIFI designation is potentially broad enough to
capture hedge funds, which have traditionally evaded federal regulation,
and investment banks. See Annie Lowrey, Regulators Move Closer to
Oversight of Nonbanks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2012, at B3. During the
financial crisis, however, numerous investment banks either folded
(Lehman Brothers) or reorganized as highly regulated bank holding
companies (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley).
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Title I requires SIFIs to provide and regularly update a
blueprint (the so-called "living will") for resolving the entity
in a pinch. 36 Meanwhile, Title II constructs the framework
for the liquidation of systemically important financial
institutions. Commonly known as "Orderly Liquidation
Authority" ("OLA"), Title II replicates the resolution process
of the FDIC for troubled banks.37 The interplay of OLA and
the living will is meant to provide a resolution plan so that if
an institution does fail, the resolution process is steered
away from bankruptcy courts and into the hands of the
8
FDIC, which has the expertise to execute that plan. 3
Regulators and academics have also proposed innovative
ways of curtailing systemic risk among banks even before
they fail. Chief among them is the Volcker Rule, which
prohibits deposit-taking banks from engaging in proprietary
trading (i.e., trading in the bank's own account, rather than
on behalf of customers) and from owning hedge funds and
private equity vehicles. 39 Conceived by former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, the rule was designed to
bar banks from making speculative investments. It was
adopted by Dodd-Frank and, after much fanfare,
implemented three years later. Another approach, not
enshrined in regulation, would tackle bank systemic risk by
setting thresholds on their aggregate liabilities-for
example, at a percentage of the FDIC Insurance Fund. n° This
follows on the heels of other quasi-antitrust solutions to
systemic risk, such as using anti-monopoly laws to prevent
banks from becoming too large or dominant or using the

36 See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d)(1) (2012).
37 Id. § 5390. See also FDIC, Lehman Brothers, supra note 2, at 35.
38 In practice, the resolution of a gargantuan financial entity is
complex. A large bank such as Bank of America is a far cry from the
smaller operations that the FDIC normally sees. Further, the lesson from
the failure of Lehman Brothers is that no politician would take the chance
of letting a large financial entity fail and wind its way through the FDIC
receivership process. As an oft-repeated critique goes, Dodd-Frank has not
ended TBTF. See Stephen J. Lubben, supra note 4, at 510-15.
39 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
40 See Macey & Holdcroft, supra note 15, at 1371.
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Public Utility Holding Company Act to streamline financial
.corporate structures.4 1
In conjunction, the ex ante limitations and the ex post
resolution mechanisms are grounded in two philosophieseither force banks to spin off risk or denominate an upward
limit on size and complexity. Both approaches are predicated
upon heightened regulation so as to diffuse systemic risk and
end TBTF.
B.

Market-Makers and Clearinghouses

Similar to banks, intermediaries in the securities and
derivatives markets have consolidated their way into
systemic significance.4 2 This Subpart explores how
regulation has handled the growth of the most systemically
significant institutions that support securities and
derivatives trading: clearinghouses.
Most securities and some derivatives are traded on
which
create
an
open,
exchanges-intermediaries
transparent market in which buyers and sellers can view
pricing and enter into transactions. Exchanges are not the
same as clearinghouses: exchanges create a marketplace
while
buyers
and
sellers 43
brings
together
that
clearinghouses ensure the fulfillment of payment and
delivery obligations. Together, exchanges and clearinghouses

See Foster, supra note 15, at 359, 402; Karmel, supra note 15, at
827-28.
42 Derivatives are financial instruments whose values fluctuate on the
basis of other variables, such as interest rates, stock prices, or commodity
values. Options, futures, and swaps are three types of derivatives. See
Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 677, 681-83 (2002).
43 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, defines an
exchange as an entity which, inter alia, provides a "market place or
facilities" to bring together buyers and sellers of securities. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §3(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(1) (2012). See also
Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2541, 2545-50 (2006) (detailing the functions of stock exchanges,
such as market-making and information distribution).
41
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take buyers and sellers from the initial matchmaking
process to the transfer of payment and product.
Exchanges and clearinghouses are integrated in different
ways, depending on the market. In the securities and
exchange-traded options markets, one central clearinghouse
serves all exchanges-a model known as "horizontal
integration. '44 By contrast, the exchange-traded futures
market is characterized by "vertical integration," in which
each exchange owns an exclusive clearinghouse.4 5 Each
model carries its unique implications on competition and
systemic risk.
Most derivatives products, however, are sold "over-thecounter" ("OTC"). OTC derivatives are not traded over
exchanges
but,
rather, are
customized
between
counterparties. Avoidance of exchanges keeps the pricing
and terms of these instruments-as well as the size and
breadth of the OTC market-opaque. Prior to Dodd-Frank,
transactions in OTC derivatives were cleared and settled on
a bilateral basis, without the participation of a
clearinghouse. Since Dodd-Frank, DCOs have emerged as
the panacea for counterparty and credit risk, with the
mandate to clear trades in most derivatives transactions.
This Subpart begins with the clearing architecture in the
securities and exchange-traded options and futures markets,
which benefit from the transparent market-making process
of exchanges. This Subpart then discusses the DCO, an
intermediary that has been charged with financial reform
but is beginning to draw attention for its own systemic risks.
1. Securities Exchanges and Clearinghouses
The literature on securities exchanges and clearinghouses
is voluminous,4 6 so I will not replicate it here. However, a

44 Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of
Clearing in the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on
Competition, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 313, 313-14 (2010).
45 Id. at 313.
46 On exchanges, see, for example, William F. Baxter, NYSE Fixed
Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. REV. 675,
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quick primer on how these two institutions function in the
securities market would be useful. Beyond this primer, I will
only highlight three points, whose significance will become
apparent when we examine the clearing architecture for
derivatives.
Suppose that an investor ("Investor") wants to buy 1000
shares of stock in the oil giant Exxon Mobile, and a pension
fund ("Pension Fund") wants to sell the same amount of
stock from its portfolio. The New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"), on which Exxon Mobile's stock is listed, will quote
the prices at which the stock can be bought and sold.
Suppose, then, that Investor and Pension Fund fill buy and
sell orders with their brokers. Investor and Pension Fund
will receive trade confirmations, and if all goes well, this is
the last they will see of the transaction-everything else
happens at the back-office level. Behind the scenes, agents of
the NSCC-the clearinghouse for the NYSE-compare the
buy and sell orders to ensure that they match. Then, NSCC
settles the trade by disbursing payment to Pension Fund and
facilitating delivery of the Exxon Mobile shares. This last
step is done electronically by the Depository Trust Company
("DTC"), which notes on its records that ownership of the
stock has gone from Pension Fund (or Pension Fund's
broker) to Investor (or Investor's broker).4 7 DTC is the
largest securities depository in the world, holding $37.2
trillion worth of certificates from 131 countries and
territories.4" DTC and NSCC are sister companies, both
owned by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation.49
675-76 (1970); Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange
Organization,43 J.L. & ECON. 437, 437 (2000); Fleckner, supra note 43, at
2543-45. On clearinghouses, see Ben S. Bernanke, Clearing and
Settlement During the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD. 133, 133 (1990)
[hereinafter Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash]; Yadav,
supra note 12, at 387.
47 DTC doesn't typically name beneficial owners but notes instead
that shares are held in street name with the beneficial broker-dealer or
bank.
48 Depository Trust Company (DTC), DEPOSITORY TR. & CLEARING
CORP., http://perma.cc/SL2S-XTHQ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
49 Id.
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NSCC is integrated horizontally into the securities
market-that is, NSCC clears and settles for a variety of
exchanges, including NYSE and the American Stock
Exchange ("AMEX"), rather than being tethered to any one
exchange. It was not always this way; for many decades, the
securities world resembled the futures world, where each
exchange has its own exclusive clearinghouse. Three points
along the evolution toward centralized clearing are
noteworthy.
First, and most ironically, it was concerns over systemic
risk that led to the creation of a systemically significant
clearinghouse in NSCC. Prior to 1976, there were three
major clearinghouses-one each for the NYSE, AMEX, and
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)-and
a handful of smaller clearinghouses serving regional
exchanges. 0 In those days, brokerages' back-office operations
processed securities transactions on paper. With the swell of
securities trading in the 1960s, back offices became so
overworked that they had to close down regularly to catch
up. Errors were rife; buyers would often not receive
securities, and sellers would often not receive payment. This
"paperwork crisis" caused the SEC to issue paperwork
standards for securities transactions. Congress subsequently
commissioned a study, which concluded that the industry
needed a national clearing system.5 1
The second notable point is that the systemically
significant NSCC was born with the blessing-and open
encouragement-of regulation. Congress, the SEC, and
industry were concerned about the risks posed by errors and
delays in transaction processing. Those risks were real and
pervasive; a modest backlog could shut down brokerages for
days, while a severe backlog could bring the industry to its
knees. Yet at the time, the understanding of systemic risk
revolved solely around processing and did not encompass
risks to the industry from the failure of one or more major

50
51

Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 44, at 321.
Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 44, at 319.
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players.52 It did not, in other words, cohere with what we
have now come to associate with systemic risk-size. Thus,
when the SEC heeded Congressional mandate and
responded with a set of amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act in 1975 (the "1975 Amendments"), the
Commission paved the way for the establishment of a giant
clearinghouse.
Under
the
1975
Amendments,
all
clearinghouses had to register with the SEC. In late 1975,
the three major clearinghouses merged, and in March 1976,
the surviving entity, NSCC, secured SEC registration-with
the agency expressing very few reservations about
anticompetitive effect and no comment at all about systemic
risk. Whereas the SEC had set out to unify the securities
clearing system, the agency ended up creating the most
dominant player that the clearing industry had ever seen.
Third, and ancillary to the second point, permissiveness
toward NSCC evoked a longstanding capitulation to natural
monopoly. Regulatory tolerance of dominant enterprises
commonly occurs where production is most efficient when
concentrated in a single firm. 53 Examples include
telecommunications, electricity generation and delivery, and
transportation; in these industries, monopolies are allowed
to survive, with government oversight, because of the high
startup costs faced by competitors and benefits conferred to
the public. And indeed, NSCC has been compared to a public
utility, a common solution for natural monopoly. Both the
SEC release that announced the registration of NSCC and
the D.C. Circuit opinion that reviewed a challenge to that
registration by a competitor of NSCC used the language of

52 For example, when pressure mounted in 1988 to revise UCC Article
8, which deals with the rights of securities intermediaries, part of the
rationale was grounded in the mitigation of systemic risk. See Francis J.
Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the Individual Investor,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 615, 624 (2000). The fear was that without the
finality in the transfer of securities conveyed in a more robust Article 8,
the industry would suffer from uncertainty.
53 See infra Section 1V.A.
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public utility to justify NSCC's dominance. 54 As the D.C.
Circuit succinctly stated, "NSCC is essentially a public
utility that is afforded a monopoly.. .. "'
2. Options Exchanges and Clearinghouses
Now suppose that Investor wants to sell an option in 1000
shares of Exxon Mobile stock. The stock might be hovering
around $45/share today, but Investor predicts that the
company's stock will jump to $60/share in six months. On
that prediction, Investor wishes to sell its options at a price
of $60/share (known as the "strike" price). Investor might fill
an order for a put option with the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE), on which options in Exxon Mobile stock
are traded. Suppose, further, that five months from now, the
price of Exxon Mobile stock jumps to $70/share, and Pension
Fund would like to buy 1000 shares; however, Pension Fund
would only do so if the price of the stock were to dip to
$60/share. Consequently, Pension Fund fills an order with
the CBOE for a call option in 1000 shares of Exxon Mobile
stock. If, within a month, the price falls to $60/share (the
strike price), Investor and Pension Fund have the right to
execute their put and call orders, respectively. If they do,
then generally the same clearing process ensues-except
that this time, the clearinghouse is the Options Clearing
56
Corporation ("OCC").

54 See Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085,
1101
(D.C. Cir. 1978); In the Matter of the Application of the National
Securities Clearing Corporation for Registration as a Clearing Agency,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13163, n.198, 11 SEC Docket 1448,
1483 (Jan. 13, 1977) ("Moreover, even in the absence of a determination
that clearing and settlement operations are a natural monopoly, the
Commission recognizes that at a future date new developments in clearing
and settlement operations may warrant the performance of all or discreet
portions of those operations by a single, cooperative organization.").
55 Bradford, 590 F.2d at 1101.
56 One difference between the securities and derivatives clearing
process, however, is that a trade stays open with a derivatives
clearinghouse for a much longer period.
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The development of the OCC reads like a compressed
timeline of NSCC. In 1973, the CBOE formed as the first
exchange serving the options market. Prior to that, options,
like most derivatives today, had been traded over-thecounter
through
customization
by
each
set
of
counterparties. 7 After registration with the SEC, the CBOE
formed a captive clearinghouse, the CBOE Clearing
Corporation.5" This duo spurred a dramatic rise in options
trading.59 The existence of an exchange streamlined and
standardized all the varieties of options so that they could be
traded on an open market. Concomitantly, the existence of a
clearinghouse meant that trades in CBOE options could now
be guaranteed. When AMEX and the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange saw the size of the market that the CBOE
Clearing Corporation commanded, they approached the SEC
about launching their own options exchanges. In response,
the SEC pushed for the creation of a central clearing entity
for the options market. This became CBOE Clearing
Corporation, which was spun off from CBOE in 1975 and
renamed the Options Clearing Corporation.
During the financial crisis, OCC expressed a desire to
access the Federal Reserve's emergency liquidity funding. As
the lender of last resort, the Fed can infuse troubled banks
with cash through its "Discount Window."6 ° Though it was
not a bank, OCC had requested access to the discount
window when tight liquidity in the financial markets created
a possibility that one of its members might fail to meet a
margin call. 6 ' Had that happened, OCC might not have had
enough liquidity itself to distribute funds owed to other
members. While OCC never had to tap the Discount Window,
Wolkoff & Werner, supranote 44, at 339-42.
Timeline, OPTIONS CLEARING CORP., http://perma.cc/KN6T-BXR6
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
59 Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 44, at 341.
60 FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT WINDOW, http://perma.cc/TKA9-GS6U
(last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
61 Nina Mehta, Options Clearinghouse Lobbies for Access to Fed
Funding During Emergencies, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 23, 2010,
http://perma.cc/9R8T-DMRF; Kress, supra note 12, at 50.
57

58
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twenty years earlier the Fed did have to step in to backstop
OCC's insufficient capital buffer in the face of the stock
market crash of October 1987. The Fed offered emergency
liquidity to banks, which were then encouraged to lend to
keep OCC afloat.6 2
OCC's near misses in 1987 and 2008 illustrate the
centrality of the clearinghouse to the options market. OCC is
so central, in fact, that the government would likely come to
a failing OCC's side to protect the financial system. Thus,
the fragility of a horizontally integrated clearinghouse lies in
its exposure to a wide universe of members. As we will
explore below, having an entire industry clear through one
giant grid might temper credit risks within the industry, but
it exacerbates both the grid's significance and the carnage if
it fails.
3. Futures Exchanges and Clearinghouses
Unlike an option, which grants buyer and seller the right
to perform, a futures contract requires the counterparties to
perform on the delivery date if the strike price is met. Thus,
if Pension Fund and Investor had executed a futures contract
on Exxon Mobile stock, they would have had to perform.
For our purposes, the more important difference between
options and futures lies in how they are cleared and settled.
Unlike the centralized OCC or NSCC, futures clearinghouses
are vertically integrated-each clearinghouse is owned by an
exchange. 63 Today, nine futures clearinghouses serve
thirteen futures exchanges,6 4 a scheme which resembles
62 See Yadav, supra note 12, at n.116 and accompanying text;
Bernanke, Clearing and Settlement During the Crash, supra note 46, at
146-50. See also U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER
1987 MARKET BREAK (1988). Coincidentally, this was also when the FDIC
stepped in to help Continental Illinois.
63 See Wolkoff & Werner, supra note 44, at 313; Bernanke, Clearing
and Settlement During the Crash, supra note 46, at 135.
64 By contrast, one clearinghouse, the OCC, serves five options
exchanges, and three clearinghouses, with NSCC being dominant, serve
six stock exchanges. Bernanke, Clearingand Settlement During the Crash,
supra note 46, at 135.
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securities clearance and settlement prior to 1975. It is an
antiquated system, little changed since the founding of the
Chicago Board of Trade's Clearing Corporation in 1925.
Vertical integration of futures clearinghouses has drawn
criticism for its anticompetitive effects. Because each
clearinghouse clears only the products sold on its parent
exchange, an exchange that currently dominates the market
in one type of future is allowed to maintain that dominance
through its control of clearance and settlement. For instance,
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) commands nearly
100% of the dealer market for the 10-year Treasury note
future.65 If another exchange were to offer the same future, it
would have to clear trades in the product elsewhere, since
CME Clearing does not clear non-CME products. Even
assuming that the upstart exchange forms its own
clearinghouse, it would face an uphill battle wooing
customers away from CME. This is because, as noted above,
size begets liquidity. With its decades-long head start, CME
Clearing would have cornered the lion's share of trading in
10-year Treasury note futures. With more contracts, CME
Clearing would have access to greater margin and be in a
better position to offset the liabilities of its out-of-the-money
members and distribute funds to its in-the-money members.
As the Department of Justice noted, the invention of a novel
financial future is usually followed by a brief period of
intense competition among exchanges; then one exchange
emerges with most of the liquidity, and its competitors exit
the market.6
Vertical integration and proprietary clearing are beset by
a different set of problems than those of horizontal
integration and open clearing. The fragility of the futures
clearing model lies not with its vulnerability to systemic risk
but, rather, with the threats it poses to competition. 67 It is
65

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TREAS-Do-2007-0018,

REGULATORY

STRUCTURE

ASSOCIATED

WITH

REVIEW OF THE

FINANCIAL

COMMENTS BEFORE THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY 10 (2008).
66 Id. See also Back to the futures?, ECONOMIST, Feb.

INSTITUTIONS,

4, 2013.
Granted, captive clearing means that the fate of a clearinghouse is
linked to its parent exchange. If the exchange goes down, so too does the
67
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the risk that an exchange can use its captive clearinghouse
to foreclose the entry of the exchange's competitors into the
market-making function. In antitrust terms, it is the
problem of leverage. In Bradford v. SEC, where the D.C.
Circuit heard a challenge to the registration of NSCC,
leverage was at the heart of the plaintiffs claims that the
three dominant stock exchanges would utilize the
clearinghouse to stifle competition from the smaller, regional
stock exchanges. Decades later, the Justice Department
showed that leverage is real, not hypothetical.6"
If futures clearinghouses were to openly clear trades
regardless of the exchange of origination, several benefits
would follow. A product could be offered on multiple
exchanges, resulting in ease of trading and reduction of
trading costs.6 9 The few examples we have of head-to-head
competition between futures exchanges have shown that
when dominant exchanges are challenged, trading fees will
decline, technological innovations ensue, and products
choices expand.7 ° These are all familiar consequences from
the lifting of restraints on trade.
Of course, these benefits would have to contend with
systemic risk. From the precedents of NSCC and OCC in the
securities and options industries, the open clearing
environment might foster the growth of a dominant
clearinghouse (tolerated by regulation) exposed to a broad
universe of counterparties. The dilemma of Dodd-Frank's
clearinghouse. Yet given the fractured futures market, each clearinghouse
tends not to be as broadly exposed.
68
See U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 65, at 10-16. Leverage hurts
consumers, not just competitors. By cutting off the entry of competitors,
the dominant exchanges remain dominant, and they also ossify. Marketmakers have no incentive to innovate and continue to carry on in
antiquated systems because nothing more is needed to charge monopoly
rents.
69 Traders could open a position on one exchange and then close it on
another. Additionally, clearinghouses could net positions on one
clearinghouse against positions on another, resulting in a larger pool of
liquidity, lower margin requirements, and savings to counterparties. See
U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 65, at 6-7.
70 Id. at 10-16.
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open-access clearing mandate for DCOs is where to strike
71
that balance between openness and risk.
4. Derivatives Clearing Organizations
Among the many demarcations that cut through the
derivatives world, the most significant is that which
separates
exchange-traded
from
over-the-counter
derivatives. Examples of OTC derivatives include interest
rate and credit default swaps. These products were
castigated for their role in the financial crisis, for reasons as
diverse as exposing a web of counterparties to credit risk and
amplifying
the
effects
of default
on
otherwise
straightforward mortgage securities. To mitigate future
havoc, Title VII of Dodd-Frank mandates the clearance and
settlement of trading in these products through derivatives
clearing organizations. Today, the clearance of OTC
derivatives resembles that of exchange-traded derivativesonly without the presence of exchanges to make a market.
As an illustration, let us return to our hypothetical
Investor. Assume that Investor takes out a loan at a variable
interest rate. Investor does not like the unpredictability of
variable rates, so Investor might buy an interest rate swap
from a bank ("Bank"). Under the swap, Investor would pay
Bank a fixed interest rate while Bank pays Investor a
variable rate. When a clearinghouse is interposed into this
exchange of payments, the positions of Investor and Bank
are novated to a DCO-that is, the DCO becomes swap buyer
to Bank and swap seller to Investor. If Investor is in-themoney vis-A-vis Bank, DCO will disburse funds to Investor.7 2
If Bank is in-the-money vis-A-vis Investor, then DCO
disburses funds to Bank.

See 7 U.S.C. § 7A-1(c)(2)(C) (2012); infra Section IV.B.2.
This assumes that Investor does not have a derivative transaction
with another party that clears through DCO against which can be netted.
This ability to net out positions is a powerful tool-it reduces the need to
exchange cash flows.
71

72
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The benefits of DCOs are three-fold. First, they can more
effectively net positions than bilateral markets.7 3 A
clearinghouse is comprised of, and governed by, members
who have met certain capitalization and risk management
requirements. These members novate their trades in
qualifying instruments to the clearinghouse. As the party in
the middle, the clearinghouse can quickly see how the
positions of its members offset each other. The second benefit
of clearinghouses, which is related to their netting capacity,
is that their birds-eye view allows them to better assess
collateral requirements.7 4 Because the DCO has numerous
positions to offset, the margin that members have to post to
maintain their positions will likely be lower than with
bilateral clearing. This lowers trading costs for members.
Finally, the design of DCOs allows them to mutualize, or
spread, large losses among their broad membership.7 5 If one
member cannot honor its obligations in a trade, the
member's losses are first borne by its margin. If the margin
is insufficient, then the DCO can tap a default fund, which
76
all members pay into as a condition of membership.
Spreading the loss to solvent members means that the
defaulting member does not have to absorb the entire loss. If
the loss is sufficiently catastrophic and the defaulting
member is systemically significant, then the shock to the
financial system could be severe. With mutualization,
however, clearinghouse members cushion the impact of the
loss.
For all the benefits conveyed by DCOs, these
intermediaries have drawn criticism as being systemically
significant entities themselves. By centralizing all credit and
counterparty risks into a handful of DCOs, regulators have

73 Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 89-93 (2011).
74 Id.
75 See Kress, supra note 12, at 65-66.
76 For further details on the default waterfall, see INTERNATIONAL

SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, CCP Loss ALLOCATION AT THE END OF

THE WATERFALL 8

(2013).
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merely shifted, rather than reduced, systemic risk.7 7 This is
essentially an argument of concentration: whereas prior to
Dodd-Frank a complex web linked numerous derivatives
counterparties, now all roads lead to the DCO (see Figure 1).
Like NSCC and OCC, the OTC derivatives clearinghouse has
itself become TBTF.
FIGURE 1: BILATERAL (LEFT) AND
CENTRALIZED CLEARING (RIGHT) COMPARED*

*Dark grey circles represent large dealers or banks that become
clearinghouse members; black circles represent small financial institutions
or end users that do not become clearinghouse members. The light grey
circle is the clearinghouse.

If anything, DCOs serving the OTC market are even more
systemically important than NSCC and OCC. The trading
volumes that OTC DCOs will have to clear are mindboggling,
far higher than those cleared by NSCC and OCC. In the
third quarter of 2013, the notional value of derivatives
activities at U.S. commercial banks totaled $240 trillion,
with the vast majority being OTC derivatives. 7' Here is
another perspective: the current size of the global OTC
derivatives market is estimated between $600 and $700

77 Mark J. Roe, ClearinghouseOverconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1641,
1672 (2013).
78 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES,

THIRD QUARTER

2013, table 3 (2013). Of this amount, the top twenty-five banks, which tend
to be the largest dealers, comprised $239.7 trillion. By contrast, the total
value of assets held by the top twenty-five banks was only $9 trillion.
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trillion (in notional terms). 9 By contrast, the combined
equity market capitalization of every listed company on
80
Earth is estimated at only $50 trillion.
Apart from concentration, there are other ways in which
centralized clearance might increase systemic risk. Lulled by
a false sense of security and goaded by improvements in
hedging from DCOs, players might take on more derivatives
at greater notional values. 8 ' Counterparties might monitor
each other less, trusting that DCOs are doing so 2-whereas
counterparties trading bilaterally likely understand each
other better than a DCO would.
The precedents for clearinghouses sustain this criticism.
In all three exchange-traded markets-securities, options,
and futures-a small handful of clearinghouses have
emerged dominant, with or without coordination among
competitors. Post-Dodd-Frank developments further confirm
this trend. Clearinghouses must register with the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) as clearing agencies or the
83
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as DCOs.
At the time of writing, there were only twenty-five DCOs
registered with the CFTC; excluding those with "dormant,"
"pending," or "vacated" status, this number decreases to
fourteen. 4 Most active registrants, like OCC, are holdovers

See Bank for Int'l Settlements, supra note 7.
See ECONOMIST, supra note 66. The $700 trillion number is also
more than ten times the size of the entire world economy. See Steve
Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why Another Financial Crisis Is
Inevitable, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://perma.cc/6Z32-NHC4.
81 Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets:
Netting, Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks
Through a Central Counterparty 53-63 (Univ. of Houston, Working Paper,
2009), available at http:/perma.cc/8YW3-JVET.
79
80

82

Id. at 61.

7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3(a)(1) (2012). See also
Clearing
Agencies,
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMM'N,
http://perma.cc/SXU9-DLYZ;
Derivatives
Clearing
Organizations,
83

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,

http://perma.cc/MQA3-2M3J (last

visited Nov. 19, 2014).
84 See Derivatives Clearing Organizations, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMM'N, http://perma.cc/R3KB-EZV2 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
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from the pre-Dodd-Frank days. This leaves the number of
Dodd-Frank-era DCOs at five . 5 A number of these
registrants are owned by the same entity.8 6 Mergers have
also permeated the industry, cutting down the number of
clearinghouses over time.8 7 These trends render it inevitable
that only a small number of DCOs will persist after the rules
under Dodd-Frank are fully implemented.
Anticipating these staggering prospects, Title VIII under
Dodd-Frank
prescribes
several
risk-management
mechanisms for DCOs, including prudential standards and
administrative supervision. DCOs designated as systemically
important ("SIDCOs") by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council will be held to higher standards.8 8 Additionally,
DCOs will have access to the Discount Window in times of
exigency, a formerly de facto policy that Dodd-Frank
codifies. 89 Finally, Section 725 of Dodd-Frank restates the
principles governing clearinghouses under the Commodity
Exchange
Act to include
antitrust
considerations.
Specifically, Core Principle N forbids restraints on trade and
anticompetitive burdens on trading.9"
These provisions do not instill great confidence in the
ability of regulators to oversee DCOs. The tremendous

85 As of the time of writing, Cantor Clearinghouse, L.P., ICE Clear
Credit LLC, ICE Clear Europe Limited, LCH.Clearnet SA, and Singapore
Exchange Derivatives Clearing Limited are the only active DCOs
registered since 2010. See id.
86 For example, several DCOs are part of the LCH or ICE consortia.
87 For example, the parent company of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange acquired the parent company of the CBOT DCO in 2007. See
Timeline of Achievements, CME GROUP, http://perma.cc/8XEC-ULFV (last
visited Nov. 19, 2014). ICE also happens to own several DCOs.
88 Whereas a DCO must have the financial reserves to withstand the
default of its largest member, a SIDCO must have the reserves to
withstand the default of its two largest members. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n, Enhanced Risk Management Standardsfor Systemically
Important Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 49663 (Aug.
15, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39).
89 See 12 U.S.C. § 5465(b) (2012). See also Colleen Baker, The Federal
Reserve as Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69, 83-97 (2012).
90 See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-l(c)(2)(N) (2012).
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responsibilities that Title VII thrusts upon derivatives
clearinghouses effectively create another set of TBTF
intermediaries that are charged with offloading credit and
counterparty risk. For the reasons outlined above,
clearinghouses will consolidate and grow into systemic
significance. And when they fail, they will have access to the
Discount Window and almost certainly follow the tried-andtrue model of taxpayer-funded bailouts.
Despite the mandate of Core Principle N, DCOs can also
restrain competition. The typical DCO member is a big bank
(dealer) that makes a market in OTC derivatives much the
same way that stock markets do. Such members have the
greatest say in how DCOs conduct their business. As the
futures market shows, where market-makers control
clearinghouses, there are many novel ways to pre-empt
competitors. To be sure, Dodd-Frank does mandate open
clearing for DCOs, which avoids many of the problems of the
futures market. Yet members can still restrain competition
from other members through the imposition of higher fees or
tougher membership conditions.
III. MAKING SENSE OF THE PARADOX
Whether as a result of regulatory complicity or regulatory
inaction, clearinghouses in the exchange-traded derivatives
markets have already maneuvered their way to systemic
significance. Now, clearinghouses in the OTC derivatives
market, whose size dwarfs that of all exchange-traded
markets combined, are being built in a framework that has
learned little from the big bank failures and clearinghouse
near misses of the past. Inevitably, these clearinghouses too
will become behemoths.
Yet regulators have generally not applied preventative
measures to pre-empt TBTF with the same rigor that has
been displayed for banks. Banks and clearinghouses are
vastly different institutions, but they can both arrive at
systemic importance. Both institutions can threaten the
global financial architecture in two fundamental ways:
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illiquidity and insolvency.9 1 Dodd-Frank squarely addresses
both possibilities for systemically important banks but only
remedies
illiquidity
for
systemically
important
clearinghouses. The ensuing impression is one of either
ignorance (i.e., that regulators are unaware that
clearinghouse insolvency poses serious systemic risks) or,
worse yet, confusion (i.e., that regulators are aware but
uncertain what to do about it).
This Section delves deeper into the systemic risk paradox
in three ways. (i) First, this Section begins by exploring the
theoretical and policy rationales for large clearinghouses. (ii)
Next, it looks into the core differences between banks and
clearinghouses to determine whether the disparate
approaches to systemic risk are justifiable. On the surface, at
least, it seems that banks are intensely regulated to head off
systemic risk, while clearinghouses are permitted to
consolidate their way to systemic significance. (iii) Finally,
this Section ponders what should be made of the attempt to
bring clearinghouses into the fold of the Federal Reserve's
lender-of-last-resort power-which is designed to bolster
liquidity-despite the fact that clearinghouses are not
expressly covered under Orderly Liquidation Authoritywhich is designed to end TBTF.
A. Justifications for Large Clearinghouses
There are both regulatory and market justifications for
the size of clearinghouses. The explanations are intertwined,
and both have their flaws.
1. The Clearinghouse as Loss-Mutualizing
Guarantor
Regulators tolerate the systemic risks of clearinghouses
more comfortably than the systemic risks of big banks. This
is because, as discussed in Section I, clearinghouses have

91 Illiquidity

and

insolvency

are

the

two

particularly

acute

vulnerabilities that banks face. HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W.
TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION 23 (2010).
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been tasked with mitigating risk in the derivatives markets.
After the passage of Dodd-Frank, numerous commentators
remarked that an unintended consequence of mandatory
clearing would be the creation of another set of systemically
important institutions. 2 Clearinghouses, apparently, are
simply different from banks.
A clearinghouse can be construed as a very large and
sophisticated guarantor-an insurance company. As the
central party in each trade, a clearinghouse is obliged to
make one party whole in the event of the counterparty's
default, either by utilizing the counterparty's margin or a
guaranty fund pooled from all members. This role is
analogous to an insurer's duty to step in for an obligation of
its insured. In principle, a large insurer tends to be more
stable than a smaller one, since it will have a larger pool of
insureds from whom to collect premiums to fund payouts.
The larger the insurer, the more likely it is to be robust.
The inverse proposition has frequently proven to hold as
well-that is, an insurance market with numerous small
insurers does a poorer job at mitigating risk and promoting
stability. To extend the analogy, we can turn to the fledgling
years of American casualty insurance regulation, which were
characterized by a multitude of insurance companies jostling
to out-compete one another. 4 They fought to offer
policyholders low premiums, driving each other out of
business in swift cycles, until periods of mass claims such as
the Chicago and Boston fires of 1871 and 1872 forced
95
insurance cartels to set rates so as to restrain competition.
92 See, e.g., Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets:
Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185 (2013); Jeffrey Manns, Insuring
against a Derivative Disaster: The Case for Decentralized Risk
Management, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1575 (2013); Allen, supra note 12; Griffith,
supra note 12; Yadav, supra note 12; Roe, supra note 77.
93 Size is no guaranty of stability, though, as the bailout of American
International Group during the financial crisis demonstrates. See Seema
G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of Financial
Regulation, 17 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 279, 293 (2011).
94 See Angelo Borselli, Insurance Rates Regulation in Comparison
with Open Competition, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 109, 113 (2011).
95 Id. at 113-14.
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Nonetheless,
cartel
members
would
surreptitiously
underprice each other, while competition from non-members
would assail the cartel itself.96 Very soon, states had to step
in and regulate rates to protect policyholders from "ruinous
' 97
competition."
The insurance example
teaches that excessive
competition undercuts the rates and reserves needed to
mitigate risk and protect policyholders. Numerous small
players, none of whom manages to prevail for long enough to
grow large or attain market dominance, populate the
resulting market. In essence, size becomes a proxy for
stability.
As with any insurer, a clearinghouse represents the
coming together and pooling of risk-not just of its members,
but also of entities that must clear through those members
because they themselves are ineligible for membership
(recall Figure 1). Thus, a clearinghouse pools all risk in a
market. Yet the clearinghouse's ability to handle so much
risk-and even whether risk should be offloaded to
clearinghouses
at
all-has
been
questioned.9"
By
guaranteeing its members' obligations, a clearinghouse takes
on risk that might have dissipated naturally had, say, a nonsystemically vital member been allowed to default on a
trade. With central clearing, however, a clearinghouse has
now assumed the losses of the defaulting member, thereby
concentrating that risk within itself. And if margin were
insufficient, the otherwise innocuous risk would be
transmitted to other members. 99

96 Id. at 114.
97 Id.
at 115. In a pattern repeated in many other regulated
industries, rate regulation prevailed in insurance until deregulation
caught on. Starting in the 1960s, states experimented with less intrusive
means of rate regulation and allowed competition to trickle back into the
industry. Id. at 115-27.
98 See, e.g., Roe, supra note 77, at 1663-74; Pirrong, supra note 81, at
4-5.
99 See Roe, supra note 77, at 1675-78. See also Manns, supra note 92,
at 1607.
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For any single counterparty, the risks that inhere in
trading can be difficult to quantify due to their complexity.' 0 0
The interjection of a clearinghouse can amplify those risks by
creating a network that pools and transmits them to other
clearinghouse members. Given the frequent correlation in
positions in any given market (for example, where most
parties might be betting long on the price of a commodity
with no parties taking the offsetting short position) and the
velocities at which losses can accelerate due to technological
advances in trading, 1°' the concentration and transmission of
risk could easily turn into a systemic contagion. 102
Ultimately, the dogma that clearinghouses are lossmutualizing guarantors justifies the existence of large
clearinghouses. This is so even though the assumptions
supporting that guaranty function are weak. In the end, the
goal of containing counterparty credit risk simply
overshadows the threat of perpetuating systemic risk.10 3
2. The Clearinghouse as Efficiently Netting CCP
Intertwined with the regulatory justification of
clearinghouse size is a market justification: due to netting
efficiency, the growth and consolidation of clearinghouses is
inevitable and even desirable.

100 Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1368-70
(2011).
101 See id. at 1373-80. See also TURING, supra note 5, § 5.6(2)(c)
(describing wrong-way risk).
102 On the threat of correlated losses posed by clearinghouses, see
Roe, supra note 77, at 1677-78.
103 Asked whether clearinghouses could "introduce new systemic risks
or become Too Big To Fail in their own right," CFTC Chairman Gary
Gensler, perhaps the staunchest proponent of DCOs, responded: "They are
far better than leaving the risks inside the banks, though the
clearinghouses have to be fully regulated and live up to strong risk
management. But it's better than leaving the risks for the next AIG." Mike
Konczal, Interview: Gary Gensler Explains How Financial Reform is
Going, WASH. POST WONKBLOG, Oct. 19, 2013, http://perma.cc/R46SWBMV.
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Because a clearinghouse is the central counterparty
("CCP") that modulates every trade, it has a birds-eye view
of the obligations of all counterparties. The clearinghouse is
able to offset counterparty positions against each other and
lower the margin that parties are required to post.
Multilateral netting of this sort reduces the aggregate
exposure of counterparties, thereby tempering counterparty
credit risk."° The larger the CCP, the more novated
positions can be netted against each other. From the
perspective of counterparties, a large CCP with robust
membership is also attractive because netting lowers
funding costs. Counterparties do not have to post as much
margin to collateralize trades. 10 5 All else being equal,
counterparties will select larger clearinghouses-and larger
clearinghouses will beat out smaller ones.
Recent scholarship suggests that counterparty credit risk
could be even more efficiently reduced if a very small
number of clearinghouses dominated multiple industries. 10 6
Currently, clearinghouses tend not to clear across product
lines.10 7 Each product has its own primary clearinghouseNSCC in securities, OCC in options, LCH in interest rate
swaps, ICE Clear Credit in credit default swaps, etc. (see
Figure 2). Even though clearinghouse ownership is trending
toward consolidation, the clearinghouses have typically not
deviated from serving single markets.

See Kress, supra note 12, at 67-69.
See, e.g., DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING CORP., supra note 7, at 1
(claiming a netting factor of 98% for NSCC so that $186 trillion in
transactions in 2012 was net settled to $6 trillion).
106 See Duffle & Zhu, supranote 13.
107 Some members of the powerhouse clearing consortia, however,
currently have operations that can handle multiple assets.
104
105
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FIGURE 2: MULTILATERAL NETTING WITH
SINGLE-PRODUCT CCPs

CCPI: WR

-

CCP2: CDS

-

ccp3 oil

Despite Dodd-Frank's efforts to shift OTC derivatives
markets from bilateral to multilateral netting, it is not
altogether settled that the gains of moving to one CCP per
asset offset the losses from abandoning bilateral netting
between two counterparties across different assets. As an
illustration of bilateral netting, assume that there are two
dealers-X, a large Midwestern bank that sells interest rate
and credit default swaps to end users in the Midwest, and Y,
a New York-based behemoth bank with whom X has back-tobacked its exposures on interest rate and credit default
swaps. Prior to Dodd-Frank, X and Y could have netted their
positions on interest rate swaps against their positions on,
say, credit default swaps, options, and any number of
instruments. Now, with the introduction of a CCP for each
asset, one CCP can net across multiple counterparties, but
the CCP in interest rate swaps is not the same CCP in credit
default swaps. Hence, the CCPs cannot net their positions
across assets.
As quantified by empirical literature, multilateral netting
for one asset is only marginally better than bilateral netting
across several assets.1 08 However, multilateral netting across
several assets beats both of the above. 10 9 The best way to

108

See Duffle & Zhu, supranote 13.

109 See id.
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maximize netting efficiency-and, incidentally, to reduce
counterparty credit risk-is to facilitate clearing across
assets by a very small number of giant clearinghouses (see
Figure 3). That solution is redolent of public utility, the
moniker conveyed to NSCC during its controversial birth. A
clearinghouse that clears for even half of the OTC
derivatives market would truly be gargantuan. It could beat
out all competition, and its monopoly would have to be
protected by explicit government regulation. It is for these
reasons, perhaps, that the idea of a public utility
clearinghouse has not gained much traction. 110
FIGURE 3: MULTILATERAL NETTING WITH A
MULTIPRODUCT CLEARINGHOUSE

Universal CCP

--

Apart from antitrust considerations, a colossus that can
clear across different assets faces some practical challenges.
First, its operators must possess the expertise to value
member positions for all the assets that it serves. The
difficulty of this mark-to-market function triggered the
financial crisis, because counterparties might have used

110 See, e.g., Adam L. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for
Derivatives, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 464 n.75 (2013). But see Paul Tucker, Are
Clearinghouses the New Central Banks?, Keynote Speech at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago Over-the-Counter Derivatives Symposium, April
11, 2014, Chicago, available at http://perma.cc/5QJ4-RCWB; Manmohan
Singh, Making OTC Derivatives Safe-A Fresh Look 17-18 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 11/66, 2011), available at http://perma.cc/M4CYSRPH [hereinafter Singh, Making OTC Derivatives Safe].
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entirely different valuations for the same trade.11 1 Hence,
despite the theoretical benefits of multi-product netting
across asset classes, multilateral netting might be best
circumscribed to single products. In addition, multi-product
netting depends on the ability of existing clearinghouses to
interoperate. Interoperability, meanwhile, turns upon the
willingness of members of one clearinghouse to sync up with
members of another, which may dilute the market shares of
both sets of members. 112 Interoperability is also complicated
by the fact that a multi-product clearinghouse would
straddle the bankruptcy laws of multiple jurisdictions." 3
Whether across product lines or not, the benefits of
netting are coming under fire. Netting favors some creditors
at the expense of others.11 4 More concretely, assume that a
clearinghouse member ("A") is in-the-money on a trade with
another member ("B"). Further, A happens to be out-of-themoney on a trade with a third member ("C"). A's in-themoney position is an asset that can be set off against its outof-the-money position with C. Yet once that is done, the asset
is no longer available for A's other creditors, especially
nonmember creditors who do not have the benefit of a
clearinghouse to redirect assets. In this sense, netting has
been criticized as redistributing assets from outsiders
(nonmember creditors) to insiders (creditors).'15 If those
nonmember creditors are more systemically important than
insiders (counterparties), then the financial system is
jeopardized.
The salience of these criticisms is an empirical issue. The
modeling done by proponents of clearinghouses suggests that

111 See Denning, supra note 80; Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisenger,
What's Inside America's Banks?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2013, at
60-71.
112 For more on how members leverage clearinghouses to consolidate
shares of the dealer market, see infra Section IV.B.
113 See Singh, Making OTC Derivatives Safe, supra note 110, at 7.
114 See Roe, supra note 77, at 1663-68. See also Pirrong, supra note
81, § 5.
115 Mark Roe, Clearinghouse Over-Confidence, PROJECT SYNDICATE

(Oct. 26, 2011), http://perma.cc/WPH9-XKFM.
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the benefits of multilateral netting outweigh the
drawbacks-especially if netting across different assets can
be achieved. This line of thinking, which trumpets the
netting efficiency of CCPs, has held sway for regulators.
Because the overarching goal is to mitigate counterparty
credit risk, the growth and consolidation of clearinghouses,
as well as their systemic risks, will be tolerated.
B.

Core Differences between Banks and
Clearinghouses

So far, this Article has proffered the (i) guaranty, (ii) risk
mutualization, and (iii) netting functions of clearinghouses
as justifications for their size-functions that banks clearly
do not share. To enrich the discussion of the uniqueness of
clearinghouses, this Subsection explores an additional point
of distinction between the two institutions: (iv) the
composition of their assets and liabilities.
11 6
Banks hold illiquid assets while owing liquid liabilities.
This classic problem makes banks vulnerable to runs by
depositors. Continental Illinois demonstrates that if a bank
is large or interconnected enough, a run could infect the
financial system. Hence, federal deposit insurance serves as
a backstop for bank liabilities." 7 After the financial crisis,
U.S. and international prudential regulators endeavored to
shore up bank assets and pare down their liabilities. The
heightened capital requirements under Basel III, for
instance, represent efforts to bolster bank reserves."' In
preventing banks from trading proprietarily or engaging in
derivatives transactions without the standardizing effect of

116 Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 306-07 (1987) ("By contrast,
money market funds have liquid assets and liabilities; pension funds have
illiquid assets and liabilities. No other entity combines liquid liabilities
with illiquid assets in the same manner as banks.").

117

See id.

118

See BASEL
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SYSTEMS (2010), available at http://perma.cc/8295-7TJR.
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clearinghouses, the Volcker Rule and Title VII under DoddFrank attempt to simplify the liabilities side.
Clearinghouses, however, are designed to avoid the assetliability mismatch that plagues banks. Conceptually,
clearinghouses sit atop a fortress of margin pledged by
members to collateralize trades. Since the financial crisis,
there has been a push by both American and European
regulators to ensure that collateral is comprised of liquid
instruments.1 1 9 Today, clearinghouses have generally
stipulated that margin consist of cash or treasuries-or that,
to the extent other instruments are acceptable, the
proportion of non-cash and non-treasuries be capped. In
collateralizing CDS trades, for example, ICE Clear Credit
accepts only cash and treasuries, 120 ICE Clear Europe
accepts a few additional instruments but subject to
conditions,1 21 LCH.Clearnet accepts only cash, securities,
and precious metals for initial margin and cash for variation
margin,122 and CME Clearing accepts cash, treasuries, and

119 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, Risk Management
Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 3698,
3724 (Jan. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 39.15(c)(1)) [hereinafter
CFTC, Risk Management Requirements for DCOs] ("A derivatives clearing
organization shall limit the assets it accepts as initial margin to those that
are [sic] have minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks."); Council
Regulation 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4
July 2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade
Repositories, art. 46, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 38 ("A CCP shall accept highly
liquid collateral with minimal credit and market risk to cover its initial
and ongoing exposure to its clearing members.") [commonly known as the
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)].
120 See, e.g., ICE CLEAR CREDIT, CLEARING RULES Schedule 401 (June

6, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/4HL-K4G8.
121 For example, gold bullion is capped at the lower of $250 million or
30% of the initial margin and subject to haircuts, while letters of credit
must strictly abide by protocols that ICE sets. See Finance Procedures,
ICE CLEAR EUROPE §§ 10.2, 12.4 (July 16, 2011), http://perma.cc/CXU8HXGB. See also List of Permitted Cover and Limits on Collateral, ICE
CLEAR
EUROPE
(July
2014),
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/
cleareurope/list-of-permitted-covers.pdf.
122 Acceptable Collateral - Ltd, LCH.CLEARNET, http://perma.cc/4W7Q74F4 (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
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money market funds at no cap and then additional
instruments for no greater than 40% of margin
123
requirements.
On the liabilities side, clearinghouse obligations are
comparatively streamlined-basically, to stand in for
members when they are unable to honor their obligations.
Clearinghouses are also in a prime position to keep abreast
of liabilities, for their very presence injects transparency into
otherwise opaque OTC derivatives markets. 24 The insertion
of a CCP minimizes the volatility that characterized bilateral
clearing, where counterparties may have valued their
positions very differently. 125 CCPs also tend to standardize
the instruments that they clear, thereby rendering
instruments more liquid and less unpredictable. 2 6 In this
respect, clearinghouses are better able than banks to gauge
their liabilities and head off losses. Given these differences
in assets and liabilities, the balance sheets of clearinghouses
1 27
are much more straightforward than those of banks.

123 See Standard Acceptable Collateral and Resources, CME GROUP,
http://perma.cc/QQX8-4H2N (follow "CDS" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 19,
2014).
124 See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, IMPLEMENTING OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKET REFORMS 10 (2010), available at http://perma.cc/XR96-HSCQ.
125 Of course, since little is straightforward with clearinghouses, there
are criticisms about the purported transparency and standardization of
CCPs as well. They include arguments that (i) transparency does little to
simplify the complexity of trading in exotic instruments, see Yadav, supra
note 12, at 420, (ii) standardization reduces hedging efficiency, see Kent
Cherny & Ben R. Craig, Reforming the Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Market: What's to Be Gained?, ECON. COMMENT. (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Cleveland
Research
Dep't)
July
7,
2010,
available
at
http://perma.cc/3CW9-UPQY ("For those looking to hedge, some efficiency
may be lost as hedging strategies have to be 'shoehorned' into
standardized instruments."), and (iii) standardization in cleared
derivatives will simply shunt risk into the other markets, see TURING,
supra note 5, § 5.7.
126 See Roe, supra note 77, at 1658.
127 Compare NAT'L SEC. CLEARING CORP., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2012 AND 2011,
AND
INDEPENDENT
AUDITORS'
REPORT
2
(2013),
and
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Item 8 (Feb.
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In conjunction, the core traits of clearinghouses paint a
picture of entities that perform critical functions for the
financial system and are capitalized robustly enough to do
so. The certainty of this proposition diminishes if
clearinghouses engage in a race to the bottom to compete for
market share, as insurance companies have done in the
past. 128 To prevent that possibility, Dodd-Frank empowers
regulators with intimate oversight of clearinghouses,
especially the systemically important ones, in certain areas.
C.

Selective Regulatory Convergence

The justifications for large clearinghouses are grounded
in traits that banks do not share. Nonetheless, both sets of
financial institutions can pose systemic risks due to their
size and interconnectivity. This Subsection explores how
regulators would handle crisis situations for big banks and
big clearinghouses, where preventative measures are needed
to prevent bailout and TBTF. As will become clear, there
would be a convergence of solutions for a liquidity crisis but
confusion for insolvency.
1. Liquidity
Under Title VIII of Dodd-Frank, clearinghouses deemed
systemically important financial market utilities ("SIFMUs")
have access to the Federal Reserve's Discount Window as a
source of emergency liquidity. 2 9 This policy made its way
6, 2013), with JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Item 8
(Feb. 28, 2013).
128 As Professor Levitin sums up:
Ultimately, it is capital ... that will determine the success
of clearinghouses. Well-capitalized clearinghouses can
absorb and diffuse losses, serving as systemic lightning
rods. But without sufficient capital (protected by
regulation), clearinghouses present vulnerable points of
financial interconnectivity that may incur excessive risk in
a race for market share.
Levitin, supra note 110, at 448.
129 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5462(3), 5462(4), 5465(b) (2012). A financial
market utility is defined as "any person that manages or operates a
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into Dodd-Frank early on, in recognition of the fact that if
liquidity dries up, the Federal Reserve will inevitably step in
to back clearinghouse obligations. Its expression in Title VIII
clarifies that the Federal Reserve has the power to intervene
on behalf of market makers and clearinghouses; previously,
the Federal Reserve could only look to a "patchwork of
authorities, largely derived from [its] role as a banking
supervisor, as well as on moral suasion. '' 130 It was within this
loose framework that the central bank acted in 1987 to
buttress the Options Clearing Corporation's liquidity. When
precarious swings in the equities markets caused OCC to
make margin calls that some members could not honor, the
Fed used its lender-of-last-resort ("LoLR") powers to induce
13 1
and cajole the money center banks into lending to OCC.
This stratagem was circuitous, for the regulator could only
aid the clearinghouse by guaranteeing the solvency of the
banks that lent to it. Today, the Federal Reserve can lend
directly to SIFMUs; in this way, the regulator has become
the "insurer of last resort" for the financial markets 13 2-or,
133
the "market-maker of last resort.
Banks are well-acquainted with the Federal Reserve's
"bedrock function" as the LoLR. 134 To prevent a run and the
ensuing panic, the regulator can inject liquidity into a bank's
balance sheets to bridge the gap between its generally shortterm liabilities and long-term assets. 135 This function has
been invoked numerous times in the name of stabilizing the
multilateral system for the purpose of transferring, clearing, or settling
payments, securities, or other financial transactions among financial
institutions or between financial institutions and the person." 12 U.S.C. §
5462(6) (2012). Baker argues that Title VIII could even grant SIFMUs
nonemergency access to the Discount Window. See Baker, supra note 89,
at 111.
130 Systemic Risks and the Financial Markets: HearingBefore the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
131 See Bernanke, supra note 46, at 145-50.
132 Id. at 150.
133 See Baker, supra note 89, at 71.
134 Id. at 84-85.
135 Id. at 85-86.
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financial system; during the crisis, liquidity was liberally
dispensed, and the Federal Reserve indiscriminately
purchased toxic assets, for the benefit of commercial and
investment banks alike. 136 This role is not without its
criticisms, including, most prominently, the moral hazard of
saving institutions that should otherwise be left to reap their
poor financial gambles. 137 In this spirit, Dodd-Frank
restrains the Federal Reserve's LoLR powers by requiring,
among other things, coordination with Treasury and
Congress,
ex
ante
policies
and procedures,
and
collateralization for emergency lending. 138
Consistent with the limits placed upon the LoLR powers,
designated clearinghouses must submit to broad conditions
under Title VIII in return for emergency funding. The force
of this corner of Dodd-Frank is obscured by its brevity. Title
VIII empowers the Federal Reserve to prescribe risk
management standards for SIFMUs-and even to potentially
override the standards set by the SEC and CFTC if such
standards "are insufficient to prevent or mitigate significant
liquidity, credit, operational, or other risks to the financial
' 139
markets or to the financial stability of the United States."
Designated FMUs must also provide regulators with advance
notice of changes to rules, procedures, or operations that
could "materially affect" the FMU's "nature or level of
risks."14 Furthermore, the Federal Reserve, SEC, and CFTC
may also conduct examinations of, request information from,
and pursue enforcement actions against SIFMUs concerning
their risks, safety and soundness, and compliance with
regulations.'
As of the time of writing, there have been eight FMUs
designated as systemically important.1 42 Several are well-
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See id. at 86-88; SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 55-56.
See SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 91, at 52-53.
See Baker, supra note 89, at 88-89.
12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(2)(B) (2012).
Id. § 5465(e)(1)(A).
Id. §§ 5466, 5468.
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See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
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known clearinghouses (CME, ICE Clear Credit, NSCC, and
OCC), while others are settlement systems (DTC and
Clearing House Interbank Payments System). Among the
clearinghouses, NSCC, OCC, and CME are to be expected,
owing to their longstanding domination in the securities,
options, and futures markets, respectively. ICE Clear Credit,
however, only became a CDS clearinghouse in 2009.143 Its
rapid rise exemplifies the crucial risk-mitigation role that
Dodd-Frank
has
thrust
upon
clearinghouses
and
corroborates the Justice Department's assertion that early
entrants into a clearing market can quickly become
entrenched as dominant providers. ICE Clear Credit's
member list also reads like a who's-who of CDS marketmakers. 144 Notwithstanding the deep pools of liquidity that
these members can provide in margin and default funding,
ICE Clear Credit is a paradigmatic example of how central
clearing can centralize risk, by pooling it from the largest
dealers in the world. Still, the SIFMU designation for this
clearinghouse demonstrates that regulators understand how
clearinghouses have become large and interconnected
enough that their credit crunch jeopardizes liquidity for the
rest of the financial system.
2. Insolvency
Clearinghouses fit more tenuously into the insolvency
regime for systemically significant banks. Currently, OLA

FINANCIAL
CRISES
(July
18,
2012),
available at
http://perma.cc/52EK-A3ZW. The eight are Clearing House Payments
Company, L.L.C., CLS Bank International, Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
Inc., Depository Trust Company, Fixed Income Clearing Corporation, ICE
Clear Credit LLC, NSCC, and OCC.
143 See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ICE CLEAR CREDIT, available at
http://perma.ccVD9E-W7GW.
FUTURE

144

See INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ICE CLEAR CREDIT PARTICIPANT

LIST, available at http:/lperma.cc/HWK5-CJXV (listing affiliates as Bank

of America, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley,
Nomura, Soci~t6 G6n6rale, Bank of Nova Scotia, Royal Bank of Scotland,
and UBS).
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under Title II of Dodd-Frank puts failing SIFIs into FDIC
receivership. While banks and non-banks alike can be
designated SIFIs, to date only American International
Group, General Electric Capital Corporation, and Prudential
Financial have been named as such. 14 5 Clearinghouses can
be flagged as SIFMUs under Title VIII, but that designation
merely triggers heightened supervision and prudential
regulation
without
implicating
any
liquidation
146
consequences.
Conceptually, the systemic importance of
financial institutions seems to proceed along two tracks:
SIFIs under Titles I and II, and SIFMUs under Title VIII.
Industry and commentators alike have queried whether the
two can meet. 147 The Financial Stability Board's most recent
pronouncement on SIFIs sidesteps OLA's applicability but
references an international regulatory presumption that
financial
market
intermediaries
(which
include
clearinghouses) are systemically important, at least in the
148
jurisdictions in which they are located.

145 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Financial Stability Oversight Council:
Designations (Dec. 17, 2013, 3:47 PM), http://perma.cc/C3ZR-HRJC.

146

See id.

147 See Letter from Kathleen M. Cronin, Managing Dir., Gen. Counsel,

& Corp. Sec'y, CME Group, to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec'y, FDIC (Nov.
18,
2010),
available at http://perma.cc/9XPF-VRLS
(requesting
clarification that CME is not a "financial company" subject to OLA); Mark
D. Sherrill, Are There Futures in Your Futures?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16
(2013) (positing that OLA can apply on the basis of an ad hoc
determination of systemic risk); Allen, supra note 12, at 1100-02 (making
the case for applying OLA to failing clearinghouses despite statutory
uncertainty). The ambiguity stems from Dodd-Frank's exclusion of DCOs
from the definition of "financial company" and, by implication, from OLA,
which applies only to covered financial companies. See 12 U.S.C. §
5381(a)(11) (2012). However, the definition includes any company that the
Federal Reserve has determined to be predominantly engaged in activities
that are "financial in nature or incidental thereto," see id. at §
5381(a)(11)(B)(iii), which may encompass clearinghouses, Telephone
Interview with Robert Steigerwald, Senior Policy Advisor, Fed. Reserve
Bank of Chi. (Feb. 24, 2014).
148
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The silence from regulators on insolvency and resolution
mechanisms for large clearinghouses is odd, given the
growing recognition of their systemic risks and the
concession under Title VIII that the Federal Reserve would
step in during a liquidity crisis. Nearly four years after
Dodd-Frank's passage, the glaring persistence of this
ambiguity suggests that regulators are still uncertain over
how to address the systemic risks of clearinghouses.
If, however, a systemically important clearinghouse were
to teeter on the brink of insolvency 149 and, as predicted, the
FDIC swoops in under the auspice of OLA, 150 what might
that resolution process look like?
Title II authorizes the FDIC to oversee the sale of a
failing institution's assets as well as its transfer to a bridge
company. 151 Due to the unique nature of clearing and
settlement, if a sale is pursued, the only viable purchasers
may well be other clearinghouses. 152 Even if legal
impediments (e.g., consent to novate) could be overcome,
prospective buyers may be loath to take on the risk. 153 If the
FDIC proceeds down the path of a bridge institution, the
receiver would face a steep learning curve in taking the helm
of clearinghouse operations, which may be specialized and

9A8L. See also
FOR

BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS &

FINANCIAL

MARKET

INFRASTRUCTURES

OICU-IOSCO,

(2012),

PRINCIPLES

available

at

http://perma.cc/Z2DB-JPWP.
149 A clearinghouse might spiral into insolvency if its losses from
uncollateralized member positions or operational problems exceed total or
liquid assets. A clearinghouse might teeter on the brink of insolvency if its
default management system is failing or likely to fail. Manmohan Singh,
When Financial Plumbing Fails - Recovery and Resolution of CCPs 11
(2014) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Singh,
When FinancialPlumbingFails].
150 See Cronin, supra note 147.
151 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
12 U.S.C. §§ 5384, 5390 (2012).
152 See Singh, supra note 149, at 12-13.
153 See id. Further, willing buyers must be able to figure out how to
interoperate with the seller's systems.
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idiosyncratic. 154 Either way, it is unlikely that the
deployment of bailout funds could be avoided.1 55
A bailout would invite instant comparison to the
inconsistent government intervention during the financial
crisis (e.g., saving Bear Stearns but not Lehman Brothers)
and all the criticisms of moral hazard (e.g., $700 billion
bailout of banks embroiled in risky derivatives trades),
whether nuanced or not. 156 For clearinghouses, bailouts
might encourage questionable practices, including failing to
demand sufficient margin or to devise adequate risk
mitigation procedures. 157 Beyond clearinghouses, a bailout
would also subsidize the decision of members to engage in
unwise trades. The bargain that all parties had struck was
clear well in advance of insolvency: an in-the-money member
is to have first dibs on its counterparty's in-the-money
positions elsewhere, and the clearinghouse is to administer
the netting. Also, prior to insolvency each member knew its
place in the default waterfall. And while the impulse of
regulators is to stop the decline of a SIFI much earlier than
traditional bankruptcy or ad hoc bailout, to graft OLA onto
the clearinghouse resolution process undoes the private
ordering for which a clearinghouse and its members had
contracted.15 8 How to balance those two extremes is the
unenviable choice that regulators must make.15 9

See Allen, supra note 12, at 1103-05.
Funds might be deployed to absorb some of the clearinghouse
liabilities, so as to sweeten the pot for prospective purchasers.
Alternatively, funds might also go toward the operations of the
receivership or bridge company. See Lee, supra note 12, at 780 (discussing
12 U.S.C. § 5384(d) (2012)).
156 For an example of nuanced criticisms, see Kenneth Ayotte & David
A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469 (2010).
157 Improper collateralization
would be especially salient if a
clearinghouse had engaged in competitive margining to attract
membership.
158 See Singh, supra note 149, at 11.
159 See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 156, at 472 ("The distress of
financial firms thus poses an inescapable choice: regulators must either
allow counterparties to take losses, and thus confront the possibility of
154
155
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Yet the problem with the insolvency regime for
systemically important clearinghouses is the signal it sends
when juxtaposed against the liquidity backstop for SIFMUs.
What do regulators imply when they explicitly stand behind
the extension of LoLR assistance to clearinghouses but
refuse to address the likelihood of clearinghouse insolvency?
They imply that clearinghouses are essential to the financial
system but that the regulators are either too timid or too
confused to commit to a resolution mechanism. Or perhaps
they indicate that by prudential regulation and market
discipline alone, clearinghouses will never fail.
IV. WHO BENEFITS FROM THE PARADOX?
Who gains from the divergent regulation of systemic risk
16
in clearinghouses and banks? Clearinghouses, for one. 1 If
we are serious about netting efficiency and minimizing
counterparty credit risk, then we must tolerate the steps
that large clearinghouses take on a daily basis, in normal
economic times, to attain market dominance. The end result
will be a small circle of giant clearinghouses best able to
stabilize the markets in the most volatile of times.
But stability cannot possibly trump competition in
perpetuity; this is an age-old balance that recalibrates when
we progress beyond a crisis. Nearly six years have elapsed
since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and four years since
the passage of Dodd-Frank. It is time to revisit the degree to
which antitrust should complement financial regulation,
particularly as regulators build an OTC clearing architecture

systemic effects, or they must use taxpayer money to prevent the losses
from being realized.").
160 Additionally, those who can offload risk onto clearinghouses also
benefit. For instance, a party to a derivatives trade would have closely
monitored the positions and creditworthiness of its counterparty under
bilateral clearing; under centralized clearing, however, that monitoring
function now resides with the clearinghouse, and the counterparties have
less incentive to watch each other closely and demand collateral. See Roe,
supra note 77, at 1694-95. More generally on the transferring and
monitoring of counterparty balance sheet risk, see Pirrong, supra note 81;
Yadav, supra note 12.
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from scratch. Large clearinghouses trigger anticompetitive
concerns that, even if tolerated, should be accounted for in
the regulatory calculus. While competition generally yields
to stability, there are at least two situations in which
antitrust must be given greater deference.
The first is when clearinghouses skirt their utility
161
obligations, such as providing nondiscriminatory access.
Clearinghouses are fundamentally a natural monopoly-in
each market, production by a dominant clearinghouse
decreases rather than increases costs. When such a naturally
dominant player starts to extract monopoly rents and
obstruct allocative efficiency, antitrust will take corrective
action.
Second, because big banks, which tend to also be the
powerhouse derivatives dealers, control clearinghouses,
there is a danger that big banks can leverage the dominance
of clearinghouses to consolidate their shares of the dealer
market. Here, antitrust is also particularly good at
anticipating misconduct and devising solutions. As others
have noted,162 no discussion of clearinghouses is complete
without scrutinizing the role of dealers.
Taking a closer look at who benefits from the systemic
risk paradox, we will find that large banks benefit-large
banks, which comprise the majority of clearinghouse
members and which, as SIFIs, are heavily regulated under
Dodd-Frank in nearly all aspects.
This Section evaluates the beneficiaries of the systemic
risk paradox from the lens of antitrust. It begins by
exploring the balance between stability and competition in
financial regulation. Then it considers adapting antitrust
solutions for natural monopolies to clearinghouses. Doing so
would insulate clearinghouses from destructive competition
while simultaneously protecting consumers from abuse of
dominance. Finally, this Section concludes with broader

See infra Section IV.B.2.
See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 12, at 1190-1204; Johnson, supra
note 12, at 696.
161
162
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observations about the interplay between regulation and
antitrust.
A.

Stability and Competition

This Subsection examines how stability and competition
were balanced at crucial junctures in the past. It further
situates the case for clearinghouses within that history, as
well as the latest empirical literature.
1. Ebbs and Flows of Financial Regulation
Considering the history of American banking, the
evidence is mixed at best on whether competition detracts
from or enhances stability. Banks failed when intensely
regulated under a rubric that prioritized stability above all
else (Continental Illinois, 1981),163 and they failed during the
go-go days of deregulation in the 1990s through the early
2000s (Wachovia, Washington Mutual). It is difficult,
therefore, to draw firm conclusions on the relationship
between stability and competition by examining the ebbs and
flows of financial regulation.
Finance in the nation's early years was an unregulated
free-for-all, with state-chartered banks minting their own
currency and vying so ruthlessly for depositors that they
epitomized destructive competition. 164 This period was
followed by a slow march toward larger, national banks,
163 Then the seventh largest bank in the country, with $45 billion in
assets, Continental Illinois was the most visible example of TBTF in the
1980s. See FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., supra note 19, at 42
("Regulators' preference for solutions that promoted stability rather than
At
market discipline is apparent in the treatment of large banks ....
various times and for various reasons, regulators generally concluded that
good public policy required that big banks in trouble be shielded from the
full impact of market forces ... ").

164 See 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM,

A

FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED

STATES (1st ed. 2002), Ch. 2 §§ 1, 4. From 1782 to 1837, over 700 banks

sprang up in the country; in the two years between 1811 and 1813 alone,
120 new state banks were chartered, but within a decade, numerous banks
would fail, with losses to the United States exceeding $1 million by 1815.
Id.
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spurred less by the need for stability than the desire to
create a unified national currency. 165 The regulatory climate
changed remarkably after the Great Depression, when the
decimation of American financial institutions prompted a
more heavy-handed approach favoring stability and risk
mitigation. 16 6 The high-water mark of government regulation
in the banking sector was the Glass-Steagall Act, which
16 7
separated commercial banking from investment banking.
The firewall kept the entities that dominated these two
sectors-banks and underwriters-from going head-tohead. 168 By setting commercial banking apart for heightened
regulation, bank regulators acted as gatekeepers that
restricted entry into this sector. The resulting set of
institutions allowed to play in this space was heavily
regulated, but it also approximated a government-set cartel
with a lock on lending and a cushion from the intense
16 9
competition that characterizes other sectors.

See id. at Ch. 2 § 4, Ch. 3 §§ 1-3.
166 See 2 id. at Ch. 3 § 4. By 1932, one in four American banks had
failed, including the Bank of the United States (not to be confused with
the First or Second Bank of the United States), at the time the largest
bank failure in history. Id. at Ch. 3. Within two years, the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Banking Act of 1933
(Glass-Steagall) would be passed. See id.
167 Glass-Steagall Act, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). See also MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES
ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 4.01 (3d ed. 1997).
168 In a regulated space, government rules often restrict entry of
newcomers or give incumbent firms an advantage. See HERBERT
165

HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS

PRACTICE § 19.2 (4th ed. 2011).
169 Soon, a wave of laws and decisions would attempt to clarify how
much concentration was permissible in commercial banking. See, e.g.,
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841-1852 (2012); Bank
Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2012); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The permissiveness of bank regulators in
utilizing a public interest exception to approve mergers with
anticompetitive effects was often out of step with antitrust regulators, who
were less inclined to issue approvals. See Edward Pekarek & Michela
Huth, Bank Merger Reform Takes an Extended Philadelphia National
Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 622-23 (2008).
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Gradually, however, the dominance of banks over
traditional commercial banking was eroded on two fronts.
First, the rest of the financial industry innovated so quickly
that many of the new products undercut the edge that banks
had enjoyed as providers of credit. For example, credit card
companies became an attractive alternative for small
businesses.1 70 Second, administrative orders slowly whittled
away the demarcations separating commercial banking from
other activities. Between the mid-1980s and 2008, regulators
expanded the ability of banks and bank affiliates to engage
in derivatives activities,1 7 1 tie nontraditional bank products
to credit, 172 trade proprietarily, 173 and merge with
investment banks. 174 Commercial banks and nonbank
financial institutions such as underwriters, credit cards, and
mutual funds were once again owning each other and
competing on equal footing.
This frenetic competition was widely blamed for the 2008
financial crisis. Critics charged that heady competition by
banks led to a race to the bottom in lending-and once
borrowers defaulted on poorly underwritten loans, the
simultaneous positions that banks had taken in the
175
secondary market on those very loans amplified losses.

Pekarek & Huth, supra note 169, at 635-36.
Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives
Changed the "Businessof Banking" 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009).
172 See Revisions Regarding Tying Restrictions, 60 Fed. Reg. 20186
(Apr. 25, 1995) (promulgating the "combined balance discount" safe
harbor, which permitted the tying of nontraditional bank products);
Chang, supra note 15.
173 See Dombalagian, supra note 4, at 515-18 (detailing regulation of
proprietary trading prior to the Volcker Rule).
174 See Fed. Reserve Sys., Order Approving Formation of a Bank
Holding Company and Notice to Engage in Nonbanking Activities, 96-97
(Sept. 23, 1998), available at http://perma.cc/B263-BGZC (permitting
Travelers Group's acquisition of Citibank while retaining insurance
underwriting and investment banking functions).
175 See Testimony of Professor Michael Greenberger, Hearing Before
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Hearing Regarding the Role of
Derivatives in
the
Financial Crisis (2010),
available at
http://perma.cc/X7YH-NS67.
170
171
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There were calls to reinstitute Glass-Steagall or some other
bifurcation of commercial lending from riskier activities such
as proprietary trading, private equity investments, and
derivatives sales. 1 76 And yet regulators approved some of the
largest mergers in banking history. After the failure of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, JPMorgan Chase
purchased the investment bank Bear Stearns and savings
bank Washington Mutual, while Citigroup and Wells Fargo
acquired the banking operations of Wachovia. All were deals
brokered by the Federal Reserve; all likely would have run
afoul of banking and antitrust restrictions just a few years
earlier. Facing hostility for bending their own rules,
lawmakers and regulators resorted to the defense of
exigency. Again and again, they argued that a financial crisis
trumps normal competition and prudential concerns. This
argument stemmed from a contrarian line of thinking that
Glass-Steagall's repeal actually stabilized the financial
industry,'7 7 but over time it was refined to a more general
position that competition must yield to stability in times of
17
crisis. 8

See Tom Braithwaite & Shahien Nasiripour, Ex-Citi Chief Weill
Urges Bank Break-up, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 2012, http://perma.cc/HP9J24BN.
177 See Paul Saltzman et al., A Spirited Conversation Assessing the
Risks and Benefits of Big Banks, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 7 (2012)
(comments of John C. Dugan, Covington & Burling) ("[M]any of these
stabilizing acquisitions [of troubled banks] and conversions [into bank
holding companies] could not have been accomplished if Glass-Steagall
were still in effect. Rather than causing the financial crisis, as some have
asserted, the Glass-Steagall Act repeal actually helped dampen its effects
by allowing these combinations at a very critical moment."). For additional
theoretical support, see Fischel et al., supra note 116, at 320-21
(extrapolating from diversification in investing as a risk mitigator to argue
for bank diversification beyond traditional banking activities).
178 See Iftekhar Hasan & Matej Marin6, Should Competition Policy in
Banking Be Amended During Crises? Lessons from the EU, 14-16 (May 12,
2013), availableat http://perma.cc/59KE-GWBS; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
The Transformationof the U.S. FinancialServices Industry, 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation,and IncreasedRisks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215,
309 (2002) ("This nearly universal adoption of the TBTF policy reflects a
general international consensus that governments must protect depositors
176

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2014

Throughout each of the above periods, there were
spectacular bank failures and questionable mergers. If one
can draw any conclusion at all on the causal connection
between systemic soundness and competition, it is that
antitrust routinely defers to how financial regulations have
balanced these interests. The constant thread in the cycles of
banking regulation is that bank regulators first lay the
ground rules, and then antitrust regulators operate within
179
those parameters.
2. Empirical Evidence and the Case for Stable
Clearinghouses
The academic literature is also inconclusive as to whether
competition enhances or detracts from stability in the
financial sector. In the benefits column are studies that show
that competition weeds out inefficient banks, promotes bank
monitoring and credit allocation, and increases sector
specialization. ° In the detriments column are studies that
link competition to erosion in capitalization (a variation of
the destructive rate competition argument) and to an
increase in risk-taking (an argument that often surfaced
during the financial crisis).18 1 While the links between
competition and stability may be unclear, some scholars
have harmonized the disparate findings with these general
thoughts: (i) competition may be more intense in some
sectors and among certain banks than others (e.g., fiercer
among the small circle of large banks than among the
numerous regional banks); (ii) the benefits of competition
may adhere more during normal times than during financial
and other payments system creditors of their major banks in order to
avoid the risk of a systemic economic crisis.").
179 Outside of banking, securities regulations have also trumped
antitrust. See Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264
(2007) (collusive underwriting). Of course, this statutory deference is
enshrined in antitrust law itself. See Shelanski, supra note 17. Infra
Section IV.C briefly considers the balance between antitrust and
regulation, but a full exploration is beyond the scope of this Article.
180 See Hasan & Marin6, supra note 178, at 2-3 and citations therein.
181 See id. at 3-4 and citations therein.
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crises; and (iii) competition may strengthen the
banking
18 2
system more in the long run than in the short run.
These principles suggest that the relationship between
competition and stability may be at its most inverse during
times of crisis. That is, in a financial crisis, the sheer scale of
mergers and bailouts that regulators confront makes it likely
that a vote for stability (via merger approval or government
subsidy) is a vote against competition. After all, big banks
are the TBTF institutions that tend to get bailed out; big
banks also implicate higher levels of concentration and more
antitrust concerns. For our purposes, the above three axioms
lead to the following question: Which set of concerns should
prevail
in
clearinghouse
regulation-stability
or
competition? The answer hinges on a related question: In
designing the clearinghouse system, are we building a
regulatory framework for the worst of times, or simply one
that hobbles along during normal times?
The answer must be that clearinghouses are meant to
withstand the worst of financial crises. In fact, that spirit
pervades Dodd-Frank, which touted clearinghouses as the
panacea for most types of risk in the derivatives markets. In
mandating clearing in markets that exchanges previously
had not even served, the law leaned heavily on
clearinghouses to backstop losses (and thereby impede
panics) during market upheaval. As explored in the prior
Subsection, clearinghouses can diffuse the fallout from losses
by systemically significant parties in several ways. Losses
are first mitigated by the out-of-the-money counterparty's
margin, then mutualized among clearing members by the
guaranty fund, then further mitigated by a capital call upon
members and, if necessary, by access to the Discount
Window. 183 This ability to slow the velocity of damage from a
major trading loss is the key advantage of clearinghouses-

182 Id. at 5. Admittedly, the literature on competition versus stability
tracks the banking sector much more closely than anywhere else. And
while clearinghouses are different than banks, the findings on
competition's effects on stability are nevertheless illuminating.
183 See Levitin, supra note 110, at 462.
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and also what drove the
legislative effort to push trading
18 4
onto the clearing grid.
These are the same features that LCH.Clearnet brought
to the table as Lehman Brothers was collapsing in 2008,
when Lehman affiliates defaulted on $9 trillion in interest
rate swaps.18 5 LCH.Clearnet, the dominant clearinghouse for
interest rate swaps, utilized Lehman's margins to cushion
losses before auctioning off Lehman's portfolio of positions. 8 6
Ultimately, LCH.Clearnet was able to minimize the damage
to Lehman's counterparties and the broader interest rate
1 87
swaps market, all without tapping the default fund.
LCH.Clearnet even managed to return some of Lehman's
1 88
margin to the Lehman bankruptcy administrators.
Our postulate that large clearinghouses are in the best
position to weather financial crises is borne out in
LCH.Clearnet's maneuvers to avoid the worst consequences
of Lehman's default. And yet, as one of the world's largest
clearinghouses, LCH.Clearnet owes its dominance to a spate
of earlier combinations. The clearinghouse itself is the
product of a 2003 merger between the storied London
Clearing House and Clearnet, two European operations that
specialized in commodities trades. 8 9 More recently, in 2012
the powerful London Stock Exchange (LSE) acquired a

184 See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 110; Yadav, supra note 12; Kress,
supranote 12.
185 See Natasha de Terdn, How the World's Largest Default Was
Unraveled, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 13, 2008), http://perma.cc/JB66-52TV; Press
Release, LCH.Clearnet, $9 Trillion Lehman OTC Interest Rate Swap
Default Successfully Resolved (Oct. 8, 2008), http://perma.cc/KFF6-L9WH;
Allen, supra note 12, at 1089-90.
186 See Allen, supra note 12, at 1090.

187
188

Id.
Id.

189 LCH.CLEARNET GRP. LTD., REPORT AND CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL

STATEMENTS 3 (2005), http://perma.cc/CV99-XARG. Clearnet traces its
lineage back to the long line of mergers in the French, Dutch, and Belgian
markets that produced Euronext.
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majority stake in LCH.Clearnet.1 9° Under this new
ownership, the entity moved almost immediately to purchase
International Derivatives Clearing Group (IDCG) from
NASDAQ OMX, a small but significant player in the United
States. 191 These consolidations might have cleared antitrust
review at each of these key junctures; however, they would
have
implicated
serious
anticompetitive
concerns.
LCH.Clearnet is a dominant player in the clearance and
settlement of interest rate swaps, especially in Europe,
where the LSE is a dominant and broadly diversified market
maker.19 2 Their combination
and then subsequent
acquisition of IDCG could have been interpreted as an effort
to twice leverage their dominance elsewhere into dominance
in the United States.
Regardless of why competition authorities blessed the
LCH.Clearnet mergers, the proclivity of a dominant
clearinghouse to engage in anticompetitive behavior need not
be left to speculation. In 2011, the European Commission
opened an investigation into whether ICE Clear Europethe dominant clearinghouse for credit default swaps ("CDS")
in Europe-excluded competitors from entering the CDS
clearing and settlement market. 193 ICE Clear Europe had
allegedly implemented a predatory pricing structure that
locked in preferential fees and profit splits for nine large
banks that constituted the largest CDS market makers in

190 See Press Release, London Stock Exch. Grp. PLC, Revised Offer to
Acquire Majority Stake in LCH.Clearnet Group Limited (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://perma.cc/6ADL-CPC5.
191 Nandini Sukumar & Matthew Leising, LCH.Clearnet in Talks to
Buy Nasdaq's Rate Clearinghouse, BLOOMBERG NEws (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://perma.cc/E884-XQPU.
192 Lukas Becker et al., A Brave New World, RISK MAG. 3 (Jan. 2014),
http://perma.cc/6KTE-F8XG (noting that CME Group's clearing volume for
US dollar interest rate swaps accounts for only 67% of LCH.Clearnet's
roughly $2 trillion a day); William Mitting, Eurex Launch Intensifies OTC
Clearing Battle, FUTURES & OPTIONS WORLD
(June
1,
2012),
http://perma.cc[YZR2-WM6J; Company Overview, LONDON STOCK EXCH.,

http://perma.cc/CD3G-EWMD (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
193 See European Comm'n, supra note 16.
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the world.' 94 As a result of these arrangements, the banks
would have been disinclined to clear their trades with
competitors of ICE Clear Europe.' 9 5 Ultimately, the
196
investigation was suspended in 2012 for lack of evidence.
Yet the "openness" of open-access clearing mandated by
Dodd-Frank remains one of the pivotal concerns for
clearinghouses. 97
As the next Subsection will discuss, denial of access to
clearing is the cardinal antitrust offense that cannot be
tolerated for clearinghouses. Yet other trespasses might be
forgiven. Indeed, to the extent that clearinghouses need to
engage in these behaviors to attain dominance in multiple
clearing markets, regulators may look the other way. The
precise degree of permissiveness, though, must be
determined as early as possible.
B. Natural Monopoly
The conundrum that regulators face with clearinghouses
inheres in natural monopolies. To efficiently reduce
counterparty credit risk, which precipitated the financial
crisis, large clearinghouses must be allowed to flourish. But
how can they do so without suffocating competition? Or,
more accurately, what consequences cannot be tolerated in
the establishment of naturally monopolistic clearinghouses?
This Subsection examines two instances in which the
anticompetitive impulses of large clearinghouses cannot be
tolerated: denial of access and leverage. Both are market
failures of natural monopoly.

194

Id.

195

Id.

Foo Yun Chee, EU regulators to suspend ICE, banks CDS probe,
REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2012), http://perma.cc/CJ2Q-Y9NM.
197 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n & Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Public Roundtable on Governance and Conflicts of Interest in the Clearing
and Listing of Swaps 144-45, Washington, D.C., Aug. 20, 2010
[hereinafter CFTC Roundtable].
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1. The Market Failure of Natural Monopoly
In a natural monopoly, production by a single firm
minimizes costs. 198 Contrary to a well-functioning market,
competition does not lower prices, increase production, spur
innovation, or otherwise benefit consumers. The average cost
of production declines as more product is supplied, so it is
more efficient to have one firm service the market than to
duplicate expenditures.' 99 Antitrust solutions to natural
monopoly therefore permit single-firm dominance but
regulate the firm closely to ensure that price correlates
appropriately to cost. 200 Paradigmatic examples include airand rail lines, electricity and natural gas generation and
delivery, and telecommunications, where one or a very small
number of producers are allowed to corner the entire market.
Clearing and settlement in most trading markets reflect
the same single-firm dominance. 20 1 As explored above, the
clearing market for each product is served almost entirely by
one clearinghouse. Even in new markets characterized by an
assortment of providers, the field of initial entrants is soon
whittled down to a few large players. The larger a
clearinghouse is, the more margin it can access, thereby
lowering trading costs for member firms and outcompeting
other clearinghouses.
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WARREN

S. GRIMES,

THE LAW
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ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 742 (West Academic Publ'g, 2d ed.

2006).
199 Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly,
Deregulation,and IntellectualProperty, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1138-39
(2008). See also SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL
MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 21-24 (1988); DANIEL F.
SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 3-5, 42-43 (1989).
200 See SPULBER, supra note 199, at 33-34.
201 See TURING, supra note 5, § 5.6(8) ("CCPs have strong natural
monopoly characteristics . . . . Where only one CCP offers clearing for a
particular product, all market participants are obliged to use that CCP.
Incumbents have an overwhelming advantage over newcomers owing to
the cost of switching.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Natural monopolies arise because the average cost of
production declines with increasing supply. 20 2 This might be
attributed to very high fixed costs or to negligible costs of
producing an additional unit of product. 20 3 As more of the
product is supplied to the market, average costs are driven
down. Simultaneously, however, high fixed costs also
increase the stakes, since competitors must capture nearly
the entire market to recoup the initial investment or sunk
costs. The risk of harm from destructive competition is
simply too great, so regulators have traditionally permitted
one firm to service the market-subject to intense oversight.
These forces were behind the SEC's decision to push the
securities clearing industry toward one provider in the
1970s. The agency saw that back-office processing could be
more efficient if centralized in one clearinghouse. Despite
fears that NSCC, the progeny of the three largest exchanges
in the country, would become a natural monopoly, the SEC
granted NSCC's registration.0 4 A Philadelphia-based
competitor subsequently challenged this decision because it
feared that the Wall Street-backed NSCC would limit the
access of competitors of the three New York exchanges to
erode the market share of other exchanges. In Bradford v.
SEC, the D.C. Circuit upheld the registration of NSCC. The
court accepted the SEC's policy rationale that competition
concerns must yield to the necessity of a national clearing
framework. Peppered by language to that effect, the opinion
culled through the statutory language and legislative history
of the 1975 Amendments to distinguish between a "national
market" system (the exchanges) and a "national clearing"

See Ghosh, supra note 199, at 1138-39.
Id.
204 The Application of the National Securities Clearing Corporation
for Registration as a Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 13163,
11 SEC Docket 1448, 1471 (Jan. 13, 1977); Larry E. Bergmann, Sr. Assoc.
Dir., Div. Mkt. Regulation, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Speech at the
International Securities Settlement Conference (Feb. 10, 2004),available
at http://perma.cc/TKL7-PWQ.
202
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system (the clearinghouses).2 0 5 Whereas the former included
enhancement of competition in its objectives, the latter
merely listed competition as one among several factors to
which the SEC was to give "due regard," but not supreme
consideration, in the achievement of centralizing the
20 6
processing of securities trades.
Nearly three decades later, the same debate would
surround the creation of derivatives clearinghouses. The
legislative mandate for DCOs trumpeted stability and riskmitigation above all other concerns. Nonetheless, DoddFrank also upheld competition as a key consideration.0 7 In
debates over what the derivatives clearing system should
look like, small derivatives sellers expressed fears that the
dominant dealers would leverage their control over DCOs to
shut out competitors from the execution market. 0 8 This
might occur in two ways: DCOs could either charge lower
fees to clear member trades, which then raises trading prices
for nonmembers; or DCOs could raise the standards of
membership so high as to preclude small players from
joining. While guidelines are built into Dodd-Frank to
prohibit anticompetitive practices, some of this cannot be
avoided-particularly the use of membership standards to
conceal anticompetitive behavior. Recognizing that DCOs
must set benchmarks of stability for admission, Dodd-Frank
has set the minimum capitalization requirement that DCOs
can impose on members at no more than $50 million.0 9 This
rule was likely proposed in response to LCH.Clearnet's
highly publicized minimum capitalization threshold of $1
trillion for membership.2 10 Nonetheless, there are other ways
in which competition can be gamed in the name of risk
mitigation.
205 Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1095-96
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
206 Id. at nn. 12, 13 & 33.
207 See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-l(c)(2)(N) (2012).
208 See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 197, at 19, 31.
209 See CFTC, Risk Management Requirements for DCOs, supra note
119, at 3701 (discussing proposed 17 C.F.R. § 39.12(a)(2)(iii)).
210 See TURING, supra note 5, § 5.6(3).
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Ultimately, as with NSCC, competition concerns are
secondary to risk mitigation.2 1 ' Hence, in the battles over
DCOs, the terms public utility and natural monopoly have
reentered the conversation. 1 2

2. Antitrust Remedies for Natural Monopoly
The traditional antitrust response to natural monopoly
has been public utility regulation, where a producer is
granted a monopoly in exchange for intimate regulation,
typically of the rates charged to consumers. 1 3 Applied to
clearinghouses, such a framework would subject cost and fee
structures to regulatory oversight, as well as public hearings
if those structures change. Clearing and settlement rates
would be evaluated periodically to ensure that they are
adjusted as cost fluctuates. The benefit of rate regulation is
that end-users of financial products would not be subjected
to inflated prices or price discrimination. NSCC, for example,
211

See CFTC Roundtable, supra note 197, at 67:
At the end of the day, the point about this is to reduce
systemic risk to the system and give people access to better
counterparty controls and have less credit risk. We hope in
that process this is viewed as a utility, but, you know,
competition should be -- while it's important should be
secondary to ensuring that the system does not become
more risky. (Comments of Roger Liddell, CEO, LCH
ClearNet Group)

See also id. at 71:
The reason there is a mandate for clearing in Dodd-Frank
is to make the financial system more stable, and I realize
there are conflicts that have to be dealt with, but I have
never heard the Dodd-Frank Act described as, you know,
an act that was aimed at, you know, simply promoting
competition among financial institutions. (Comments of
Jonathan Short, ICE Trust)
212 See id. at 67 (comments of Roger Liddell); Singh, supra note 110,
at 17-28; Levitin, supra note 110, at 445 n.75; Tucker, supra note 110, at
12. It is slightly inaccurate to mention public utility alongside natural
monopoly. Public utility is more aptly thought of as a solution to natural
monopoly's market failures.
213 See SPULBER, supra note 199, at 271-79.
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21 4
has long maintained that it offers clearing services at cost;
still, the cost structures of clearinghouses may not be
altogether transparent or straightforward.2 1 5 Public hearings
would confer the added benefit of shining light on an
industry that is not well understood.2 1 6 Meanwhile, rate
regulation would ensure that clearing services are affordably
priced, by preventing clearinghouses from disguising high
prices (and high profit margins) as costs of compliance with
Dodd-Frank's risk management requirements. If clearing
prices were truly held at or very close to a clearinghouse's
costs, then access to clearing services would be broadened.
But public utility treatment of clearinghouses is
untenable. In general, public utilities are conferred the right
to engage in practices that would otherwise be prosecuted as
monopolization. As with other monopolies, a dominant
clearinghouse has little incentive to devise improvements to
its processes.21 7 More specific to the clearing industry, it is
very difficult for regulators to effectively monitor and set
rates. Regulators simply may not have the expertise to gauge

214
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See Crystal Bueno, More Transparency on Clearing Costs, DTCC
NEWSLETTER,

Aug.

2009,

http://perma.cc/XED2-JLZ9.

That

contention was challenged, however, by NASDAQ as it tried to establish a
rival clearinghouse to NSCC's "monopoly." NASDAQ's venture never took
off though, in part because NSCC instituted price reductions beforehand.
See Nasdaq Drops Clearing Initiative, SEC. TECH. MONITOR, Nov. 2, 2009,
http://perma.cc/83CR.ZRSS.
215 See Nasdaq Drops Clearing Initiative, supra note 214. NSCC's
price reductions might smack of price predation, a claim that the
clearinghouse has encountered before. See Letter from Charles Douglas
Bethill, Thacher Proffitt & Wood, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, Sec. and
Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 2, 2004), availableat http:lperma.cc/SL8N-5ZV3.
216 Further complicating the cost issue is the fact that pricing for
clearinghouses seems to be entwined with pricing in the execution market.
On CFTC proposals for price transparency in trade execution, as well as
efforts to derail those proposals, see Swap Execution Facility Clarification
Act, H.R. 2586, 112th Cong. (2012); Karen Brettell, CFTC Will Enforce
Trade Price Transparency-Gensler, REUTERS
(May
2,
2013),
http://perma.cc/SH7A-MFPQ.
217 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 198, at 742, 747.
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appropriate pricing,2 1 and clearinghouses might evade rate
regulation by increasing prices in another market controlled
by an affiliate-for example, in settlement or marketmaking. Hand in hand with the difficulty of rate regulation
are the natural ebbs and flows to the scope of the utility's
monopoly power. Over time, for instance, a dominant
player's position might be eroded by technological advances
which enable rivals to lower their prices and compete more
effectively.2 19 If so, then the setting of rates by regulation
might be counterproductive,
coddling
anachronistic
enterprises so as to stifle beneficial competition.
Over the last few decades, antitrust has become
comfortable with a lighter regulatory touch. A slew of case
law and academic commentary against the inefficiencies of
public utility has resulted in the consensus that this regime
is excessively cumbersome. 220 For natural monopolies, the
movement has been away from heavy-handed public utility
regulation and toward regimes where regulators sit back and
let competitors do most of the work, intervening only where
the bottleneck inherent in a natural monopoly might be
manipulated to stifle competition.2 21 One such regime is the
essential facilities doctrine, a version of which already
appears in Dodd-Frank.

218 On the general dearth of regulatory expertise regarding the
clearing and settlement of OTC derivatives, see Dan Awrey, Regulating
Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 307-08 (2011).
219 The rise of ICE, for instance,
is often attributed to the
conglomerate's embrace of technology. Interestingly, as an upstart in the
early 2000s, it was ICE that accused NYMEX of monopolization. See New
York Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. InterContinental Exch., Inc., 323 F. Supp.
2d 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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221 Joseph
D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
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1361 (1998).
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While disagreement persists over the vitality of the
essential facilities doctrine,1 2 courts and commentators
agree as to its elements: (i) a monopolist controls an
essential facility which (ii) a competitor is unable practically
or reasonably to duplicate, and (iii) use of the facility is
the
denied to a competitor even though (iv) it is feasible for
22 3
If
monopolist to provide access to the facility.
clearinghouses were treated as essential
facilities,
clearinghouses would have to grant open, nondiscriminatory
access to traders; where access is denied, either regulators or
competitors would be able to bring actions if they could
satisfy the above elements.
To some extent, this framework-where regulators simply
set the "background rules" for industry behavior and then
allow competition among rival producers to provide "the
protection necessary for end-users" 22 4 -already exists. DoddFrank
has
mandated
open-access
rules
for
all
clearinghouses.226 On the enforcement front, at least one
derivatives dealer has claimed that large clearinghouse
members corner the trading market by restricting access to
222 Compare United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224
U.S. 383, 411-13 (1912) (seminal case on equal and nondiscriminatory
access, though the term essential facilities was not used), and Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 611 (1985)
(affirming verdict for plaintiff but declining to address the essential
facilities issue), and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,
382 (1973) (finding that an electric power utility's refusal to sell wholesale
power or transmission services to a competing municipal utility
constituted monopolization, though the term essential facilities was not
used), with Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 410-11 (2004) ("We have never recognized [the essential
facilities] doctrine, and we find no need either to recognize it or to
repudiate it here."). See also Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller,
Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4-8 (2008); Glen 0.
Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177,
1183-84 (2002).
223 MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th
Cir. 1983).
224 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 221, at 1361.
225 See 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1(c)(2)(C) (2012); CFTC, Risk Management
Requirements for DCOs, supra note 119, at 3700-01.
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clearing. 221 Yet neither the statutory hook nor the private
action has used the term essential facility. Despite the
controversy surrounding essential facilities in general
antitrust circles, this framework can be useful in
supplementing the regulation of clearinghouses by, among
other things, giving shape to the open-access obligation and
clarifying when rivals of clearinghouse members might be
able to pursue a private right of action.
Central to the appropriateness of borrowing from the
essential facilities doctrine, of course, is whether
clearinghouses are even essential facilities. The simple
answer is yes-they are essential to trading in securities and
derivatives. Gone are the days when clearinghouses were
tied only to exchange-traded products; with Dodd-Frank's
universal clearing requirement, clearinghouses have become
integral to the OTC derivatives market as well. Other than a
few technical exceptions, no securities or derivatives trade
can be completed without involving a clearinghouse.22 7
The more interesting takes on clearinghouse essentiality
come by way of analogy. Clearinghouses are commonly
referred to as the "plumbing" of the financial architecture.2 2 8
Where they are required, they play a fundamental part in
ensuring the execution of trades. It might be mere
coincidence that the clearing and settlement function is
likened to plumbing, just as it is that Title VIII of DoddFrank coined the term "utility" to describe certain tradeprocessing entities such as clearinghouses. 229 However, in
these coincidences there is metaphor. Just as plumbing is a
See Complaint, MF Global Capital LLC v. Bank of America Corp.,
No. 1:13-cv-5417, 2013 WL 7210066 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2013).
227 Dodd-Frank includes exceptions for some end-users as well as for
hedging purposes. Of course, critics have charged that these exceptions are
large enough to frustrate the spirit behind the law. See William F. Kroener
III, Derivatives Reforms, in DODD-FRANK FINANCIAL REFORM AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE BANKING INDUSTRY 247 (ALI-ABA, ed., 2010).
228 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Remarks at the 2011 Financial Markets Conference: Clearinghouses,
Financial Stability, and Financial Reform (Apr. 4, 2011), available at
http://perma.cc/N6TW-LUPC.
229 See 12 U.S.C. § 5462 (2012).
226
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function essential to property ownership that works better
when overseen by a public entity (e.g., hooked up to a city
sewer line), clearing is an essential part of trading that
works better if more types of trades are routed through one
clearinghouse. The most apt description of a clearinghouse,
then, is a behind-the-scenes infrastructure that supports
trading.
Infrastructures are well suited for essential facilities
treatment. 230 Their primary value derives not from the
immediate benefits of consumption but from the productive
downstream use of the infrastructure. 23 1' As applied to
clearinghouses, the argument is that collectively, the
clearing infrastructure generates value for the financial
markets by injecting stability into the trading of oftenvolatile products. Clearinghouses buffer one set of
counterparties from default by the other set, and
clearinghouses also enable end users to hedge against risk.
These are unquantifiable benefits best protected by open,
nondiscriminatory access.
If clearinghouses are an essential facility for trading, then
what might denial of use of clearinghouses look like?
A clearinghouse is comprised of members who must meet
capitalization and other requirements and pay into a
guaranty fund in order to clear trades. The most powerful
clearinghouse members are large banks, which tend to be the
dominant
market
makers
in
OTC
derivatives.2 3 2
Nonmembers can only clear trades by going through a
member. Within this framework, denial of use might occur if
incumbent members set membership requirements so high
as to bar smaller institutions from being able to join. In our
hypothetical of the mid-size Midwestern bank and the
goliath New York bank, assume that both banks sell
derivatives but only the big bank belongs to a clearinghouse.
Then, with all else being equal, the regional bank would

230
231
232
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See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 222, at 11-18.
Id. at 14.
Griffith, supra note 12, at 1190-1204; Yadav, supra note 12, at
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have a higher markup on its products because it would have
to pay a clearinghouse member in order to clear trades.
Lack of access to clearing and settlement threatens the
viability of smaller sellers of derivatives. Now that clearing
has been mandated for almost all trading, access to
clearinghouses has become a primary concern. In both
Europe and the United States, suppression of competition in
the market-making of credit default swaps has allegedly
come by way of denial of access to clearinghouses.2 33
C. Future Questions
Borrowing
concepts
from antitrust
to
enhance
clearinghouse regulation implicates several questions. This
Article highlights only a few of them for future exposition.
First, what incentives are created for consumers of
clearinghouses-end-users, hedgers, and even speculators in
derivatives-if these intermediaries are treated as essential
facilities? Competition depresses prices, which would be the
expected
outcome
for
open-access
clearing.2 3 4 Yet
foundational works on natural monopolies justified their
regulation on the bases of sunk costs and public goods. That
is, natural monopolies must provide highly useful services
such as electricity that cannot be widely dispensed without
government protection from competition. 235 The question of
whether clearing is a public good is far from settled,
especially if the clearing grid makes it easier to transact in
instruments (specifically, OTC derivatives) associated with
financial crises.
Second, even if the essential facilities approach is
justifiable, what are the remedies for violation? If the

233 See Complaint at 21, MF Global Capital LLC v. Bank of America
Corp., No. 1:13-cv-5417, 2013 WL 7210066 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2013).
Plaintiffs' attorneys even state that clearing is "essential," though they do
not use the term "essential facilities." Id. See European Comm'n, supra
note 16.
234 See Erik Gerding, Derivatives: Learning to Love Anti-competitive
Behavior?, THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 2, 2013), http://perma.cc/BLJ7-77UB.
235 See SPULBER, supra note 199, at 4.
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concept of open, nondiscriminatory access is protean, the
remedy of the essential facilities doctrine is even more so. In
United States v. Terminal RailroadAssociation, the seminal
case on essential facilities, the Supreme Court struggled
with this very issue. Short of divestiture, what was the
proper scope of a consent decree meant to address the
acquisition by a dominant operator of railroad lines of the
railroad terminals surrounding St. Louis? 36 This question of
remedies has vexed subsequent courts.
Third, what types of international coordination are
necessary to give force to domestic regulation? Given the
global nature of today's financial markets, financial
intermediaries often have their pick of regulatory
jurisdictions.2 3 7 To pre-empt regulatory arbitrage, the CFTC,
SEC, and U.S. antitrust authorities must understand
238
European approaches to natural monopoly.
Finally, what is the proper balance between antitrust and
clearinghouse regulations? Dodd-Frank contains a savings
clause that expressly preserves antitrust enforcement.239
While in theory the savings clause permits the cohabitation
of antitrust and regulation, in reality the force of such
236 See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411-13
(1912); Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities,51
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1195-96 (1999) ("Terminal Railroad is particularly
notable for the remedial path that the Court specifically declined to take
.... If the competitive independence of the various terminal companies
and bridge owners could have been restored, it seems obvious that it would
have been preferable from the perspective of consumer welfare to have
done so, rather than rely on a remedy that required the creation of a
permanent mechanism for control of the combination's undisputed
monopoly power by continuous monitoring and adjustment of the rates,
terms, and conditions of ownership and use.").
237 See, e.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENTS AND CAPITAL

STANDARDS 219 (2006), available at http://perma.cc/X3LG-5ELY;

Enhanced Risk Management Standards for Systemically Important
Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 49,663, 49,671 (Aug. 15,
2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39).
238 On the possibility of treating European clearinghouses as essential
facilities, see TURING, supra note 5, § 7.8.
239 See 12 U.S.C. § 5303 (2012).
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clauses has been muddled by Supreme Court decisions.2 4 °
The next test of how antitrust laws apply to regulated
industries might well come as a challenge to the dominance
of clearinghouses. In anticipation of that development,
clearinghouse scholars could take up that rebalance now.
V.

CONCLUSION

Financial regulators have taken disparate approaches to
the oversight of banks and clearinghouses. Even though
these two intermediaries play vastly different roles and are
characterized by different core traits, both have become
systemically important due to their size and connectivity.
Yet banks today are regulated under a rubric that reins in
sophistication and tries to eradicate TBTF, while growth and
assumption of risk are tolerated for clearinghouses without
similar measures being taken to prevent TBTF.
The paradox and ancillary issues explored in this Article
can be boiled down to two simple questions: why does the
paradoxical regulation of banks and clearinghouses exist,
and who benefits from it?
The first question is straightforward. Regulators have
prioritized mitigating certain risks over others-specifically,
counterparty credit risk over systemic risk-in the trading
markets. To effectively guarantee and efficiently net
counterparty obligations, clearinghouses must be large and
interconnected and therefore systemically significant.
As for the second question, the beneficiaries are the large
banks that control clearinghouses. Because regulators have
prioritized
credit
risk
mitigation
over
antitrust
considerations, they must also tolerate the anticompetitive
effects of clearinghouses-which, due to economies of scale,
are natural monopolies. Yet if financial regulators
incorporate antitrust principles, then it will be less likely
that a clearinghouse will be used as an instrument of dealer
leverage.
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